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ETHOS AT THE INTERSECTION: CLASSICAL 
INSIGHTS FOR CONTEMPORARY 
APPLICATION 
Melissa H. Weresh* 
“[W]e seem able to approach ethos only within a set of paradoxes and . . . 
contradictions.”1 
Much has been written about ethos, or character, in rhetoric. Ethos as one 
of the artistic proofs is an important consideration for persuasion and therefore 
important for evaluating and crafting persuasive legal texts. By comparing and 
synthesizing classical and contemporary notions of ethos, this Article will craft a 
framework, or template, for examining ethos-based rhetorical strategies em-
ployed in persuasive documents. It will do so by first examining the classical rhe-
torical views of ethos from Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero. It will then compare 
and contrast classical views with those of contemporary scholars to situate 
ethotic appeal in written communication. 
Two questions will guide the effort to locate ethotic appeal in persuasive 
texts. The first is a longstanding debate about whether a speaker or writer must 
possess ethos or good character, or whether ethotic appeal might be based upon 
an appearance of ethos. The second, related question is another debatable con-
cept within considerations of ethos—that of its dwelling. Does ethos dwell in the 
speaker/writer? In the speech/text? Or in the exchange that takes place between 
speaker/writer and the audience? A careful consideration of classical and con-
temporary notions of ethos reveals that it dwells in all of these places. Thus, 
armed with an array of possible dwellings for ethotic appeal, and after consider-
ing modern conceptions of audience for written communication, this Article will 
engage in a practical application: using a framework that emerges from the con-
sideration of these questions to examine ethos-based rhetorical strategies in a le-
gal text. 
“Ethos . . . shifts and changes over time, across texts, and around competing 
spaces.”2 
 
*  Dwight D. Opperman Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. The 
author would like to thank the following colleagues for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this Article: Mark Hannah, Brian Larson, Kristen Tiscione, Karen Wallace, and 
Laura Webb. I would also like to thank the Classical Rhetoric/Contemporary Law (CRCL) 
working group, the William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, and the Nevada Law Journal 
for hosting a wonderful Classical Rhetoric as a Lens for Contemporary Legal Praxis sympo-
sium, which gave rise to this Article. 
1  ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY xxvi (James S. Baumlin & Ti-
ta French Baumlin eds., 1994). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Classical rhetoricians such as Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero addressed the 
notion of ethos in persuasion.3 Their focus was on ethotic appeal in spoken 
communication.4 Modern rhetorical theories often turn the lens to written 
communication.5 The focus of this Article is to use the advice of classical and 
contemporary scholars of ethos to craft a template for examining ethotic appeal 
in a legal text. That will (eventually) be this Article’s goal as it considers 
ethotic appeal in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in 
Pennsylvania v. Dunlap.6 
Such an endeavor raises two initial, intertwined questions about the advice 
from the classics—ones that have also been examined by modern scholars. 
First, is ethos something that is possessed by the speaker/writer, or is it some-
thing that the speaker/writer merely projects? This Article will address the pos-
session/appearance debate first, but it will not resolve it, as this question is like-
ly compounded by the second question: Where does ethos dwell? 
Maddeningly, or perhaps wisely,7 this Article will also address but not resolve 
this question, as to resolve either question prioritizes one theory at the expense 
of others, potentially depriving scholars of potential dwellings for ethos and po-
tential considerations for ethotic appeal. Thus, this Article will address both 
questions, attempting not to resolve them definitively, but to explore the theory 
underlying posited answers, which will then be used to craft a framework, or 
template, for examining ethotic appeal in a text. 
In Part I, this Article will examine the question of ethotic possession or ap-
pearance, considering classical and contemporary positions.8 Then, in Part II, 
this Article will consider the question of where ethos dwells.9 This question 
will also be examined from classical and contemporary positions, with speak-
er/writer, speech/text, and the exchange between speaker/writer and audience 
as potential ethotic dwellings.10 Turning the attention to an application of per-
suasive ethotic appeal in written communication, Part III will address modern 
 
3  See infra Parts I, II. 
4  See infra Part I. 
5  See generally James S. Baumlin & Craig A. Meyer, Positioning Ethos in/for the Twenty-
First Century: An Introduction to Histories of Ethos, 7, 78 HUMAN. 1 (2018). 
6  See Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964–67 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
7  I am not the first to choose an approach that refuses to prioritize one theory or conclusion 
over another. See, e.g., Andrea A. Lunsford & Lisa S. Ede, Classical Rhetoric, Modern 
Rhetoric, and Contemporary Discourse Studies, 1 WRITTEN COMM. 78, 79 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Lunsford & Ede, Classical Rhetoric]. The authors acknowledge, “[v]aluable time and 
scholarly energies are often wasted as champions of different methodologies within a single 
discipline try to convince one another that theirs is the only acceptable approach.” Id. 
8  See infra Part I. 
9  See infra Part II. 
10  See infra Part II. 
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notions of audience.11 Finally, in Part IV, this Article will present a novel tem-
plate for evaluating ethos-based rhetorical strategies in the posited loci from 
Part II, and then use that template to evaluate ethotic appeal in a legal text.12 
I. ETHOS IN THE CLASSICAL VIEW: POSSESSION OR APPEARANCE? 
Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero each addressed the concept of ethos in per-
suasion.13 Their viewpoints and corresponding advice differ, however, in 
whether a speaker must possess good character, or whether ethotic persuasion 
may rest on projecting an appearance of good character.14 The question of pos-
session or appearance, and the advice offered by classical rhetoricians on how 
to evince ethos, will provide the foundation for the subsequent consideration of 
where ethos dwells.15 The theories underlying posited answers to these ques-
tions will undergird the suggested framework for examining a text for ethotic 
appeal.16 
For Isocrates, ethos was the actual character of the rhetor, and ethotic ap-
peal was therefore dependent on prior reputation.17 Thus, in Isocrates’s view, 
ethos was possessed. Aristotle’s position was that ethos existed in the speaking 
event, and was therefore projected during the event rather than dependent on 
some prior notion of the speaker.18 For Aristotle, the appearance of ethos in the 
speaking event was a mark of persuasion.19 Finally, for Cicero, while his ad-
vice on ethos would suggest a view akin to that of Aristotle, the Roman notion 
of character as an inherent and immutable characteristic suggests that, for Cice-
ro, ethos was both possession and appearance.20 In this Part, this Article exam-
ines the advice of the classic rhetoricians for evincing ethos so as to further our 
understanding of this artistic proof of persuasion. 
A. Isocrates: Possession 
Isocrates was one of the Ten Attic Orators, whose status in Athenian cul-
ture was well recognized.21 In Isocrates’s view, possession of ethos was essen-
tial to persuasion.22 In fact, according to Isocrates, it was a man’s prior reputa-
 
11  See infra Part III. 
12  See infra Part IV. 
13  See infra Sections I.A–C, II.A.1, II.B.1, II.C.1. 
14  See infra Part I. 
15  See infra Part II. 
16  See generally infra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
17  See infra Section I.A and accompanying notes. 
18  See infra Section I.B. 
19  See infra Section I.B. 
20  See infra Section I.C and accompanying notes. 
21  Attic Orators, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CLASSICAL WORLD (John Roberts ed., 2007); 
see also GEORGE KENNEDY, THE ART OF PERSUASION IN GREECE 125 (1963). 
22  Isocrates advises: 
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tion that established his ethos.23 Isocrates distinguished the persuasive appeal 
of words spoken by an “honorable” man, one “of good repute,” from the inferi-
or speech of “men who live under a cloud.”24 And, in Isocrates’s view, posses-
sion of ethos—being an honorable man rather than merely projecting the ap-
pearance of honor—was essential for ethotic appeal. 
Isocrates emphasized that “the argument which is made by a man’s life is 
of more weight than that which is furnished by words[.]”25 He stressed that: 
[P]robabilities and proofs and all forms of persuasion support only the points in 
a case to which they are severally applied, whereas an honorable reputation not 
only lends greater persuasiveness to the words of the man who possesses it, but 
adds greater lustre to his deeds, and is, therefore, more zealously to be sought af-
ter by men of intelligence than anything else in the world.26 
Isocrates also situated character in the man, developed prior to the 
speech.27 Ethos was therefore necessarily prediscursive.28 “[F]or Isocrates, the 
power of character preceded and underlay the power of speech. Nothing medi-
ated between them, and, for philosophical and political reasons as well as for 
rhetorical reasons, effective persuasion relied on good character.”29 
Grounding his theory of ethos as possession as opposed to appearance was 
consistent with Isocrates’s disdain for the Sophists, a group of traveling teach-
ers whose work received both positive and negative reactions.30 While Isocra-
 
[T]he man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, 
on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honorable name among his 
fellow-citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men 
of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud . . . . 
ISOCRATES, ANTIDOSIS § 15, 278, reprinted in PERSEUS DIGITAL LIBRARY (George Nolin ed., 
1980), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144 
%3Aspeech%3D15%3Asection%3D278 [https://perma.cc/5A9Z-9SM2] (last visited Mar. 5, 
2020). 
23  See id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at § 15, 280, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A 
1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D15%3Asection%3D280 [https://perma.cc/3XHJ-QZK7] (last  
visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
27  See William Benoit, Isocrates and Aristotle on Rhetoric, 20 RHETORIC SOC. Q. 251, 257 
(1990) (emphasizing how Isocrates “juxtaposes the ‘argument which is made by a man’s 
life’ with ‘that which is furnished by words’ ”). 
28  Modern scholars have referred to this prior reputation ethos as “prediscursive ethos[,]” or 
that which precedes discourse. See, e.g., Ruth Amossy, Ethos at the Crossroads of Disci-
plines: Rhetoric, Pragmatics, Sociology, 22 POETICS TODAY 1, 7 (2001) (explaining “predis-
cursive ethos”). 
29  J. Christopher Rideout, Ethos, Character, and Discoursal Self in Persuasive Legal Writ-
ing, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 19, 29 (2016) [hereinafter Rideout, Discoursal Self]. 
30  Sophists, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION 669, 673 (Simon Horn-
blower et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014). The text explains that positive views of the Sophists can be 
demonstrated by their successful careers and “considerable demand for their services, espe-
cially in providing rhetorical training for aspiring politicians.” Id. In contrast, conservatives 
viewed the Sophists “as subversive of morality and tradition, in view both of their natural-
20 NEV. L.J. 877 
882 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
tes did study under the Sophist Gorgias,31 he was critical of the manipulative 
tactics of the Sophists,32 believing that his approach to rhetoric was more a 
program of character development and an endeavor of political discourse.33 It is 
therefore consistent with Isocrates’s disdain for the artifice of the Sophists that 
he would insist on ethos in the actual character of the speaker, rather than in the 
speaker’s ability to merely present himself as a man of good repute.34 
B. Aristotle: Appearance 
While Aristotle was also critical of the Sophists,35 in The Rhetoric he 
moved away from the possession view of Isocrates and toward a view of ethos 
that allows for the projection of good character. As one scholar observes: 
If Isocratean tradition asserts the speaker’s need to be good, Aristotelian tradi-
tion asserts the sufficiency of seeming good. For the former, discourse becomes 
 
istic outlook on morality and religion, and of their teaching (especially to the young) of 
techniques of argument.” Id. Isocrates himself contrasted his view of character with that held 
by the Sophists in the following passage: 
And yet those who desire to follow the true precepts of this discipline may, if they will, be 
helped more speedily towards honesty of character than towards facility in oratory. And let no 
one suppose that I claim that just living can be taught; for, in a word, I hold that there does not 
exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures. Nevertheless, 
I do think that the study of political discourse can help more than any other thing to stimulate 
and form such qualities of character. 
ISOCRATES, AGAINST THE SOPHISTS § 13, 21, reprinted in PERSEUS DIGITAL LIBRARY (George 
Nolin ed., 1980), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A 
1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D13%3Asection%3D21 [https://perma.cc/GYF2-F3LQ] (last  
visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
31  Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 27 (noting that “Isocrates lived from 436 to 
338 B.C., which allowed him to study under the great Sophist Gorgias.”). 
32  Id. (explaining that in Isocrates’s speech, Against the Sophists, Isocrates “attack[ed] the 
pretensions of the Sophists . . . .”). 
33  Id. (referring to Isocrates’s view of his own system as one of the development of “civic 
knowledge and the art of political discourse, as a way of improving the welfare of the Greek 
state.”). 
34  Id. at 27–28. Rideout explains Isocrates’s disregard for the character of the Sophists, not-
ing that 
Isocrates distanced himself from the Sophists by attacking them as pretentious and arrogant in 
their claim to know all that is necessary for happiness, prosperity, and success; as eager for 
money at the expense of their students; and as teaching persuasion as a set of inflexible rules, 
without regard for the way that experience must further guide the appropriate uses of persuasion. 
Id. This then led to Isocrates’s own straightforward view of ethos: “[F]or Isocrates, good 
character was an uncomplicated matter of possession—the good orator and writer quite 
simply possessed good character.” Id. at 30. 
35  See, e.g., Martin D. Carcieri, A Progressive Reply to the ACLU on Proposition 209, 39 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 141, 161 n.79 (1998) (noting that “much of Plato and Aristotle’s in-
tellectual project was to expose the flaws in the work of the Sophists, those colorful itinerant 
teachers of manners and oratory whose educational revolution both advanced and under-
mined classical Athenian democracy” and that “Aristotle’s basic response to the Sophists 
was that they abused logic by failing to make appropriate distinctions of kind and degree 
with respect to the subject matter under discussion.”). 
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a revelation of character; for the latter, discourse becomes an active construction 
of character—or, rather, of an image, a representation of character—and Aristo-
telian theory seeks to outline the means whereby such image-making is 
achieved.36 
In Aristotle’s view, ethos was discursive.37 He stressed that: 
The character [ethos] of the speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is 
so uttered as to make him worthy of belief; for as a rule we trust men of probity 
more, and more quickly, about things in general, while on points outside the 
realm of exact knowledge, where opinion is divided, we trust them absolutely.38 
Because Aristotle did not insist on the possession of good character, but 
emphasized how to project good character, it was essential that ethos be situat-
ed in the speech, rather than in some prior reputation of the speaker. Aristotle 
advised: 
This trust, however, should be created by the speech itself, and not left to de-
pend upon an antecedent impression that the speaker is this or that kind of man. 
It is not true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the probity of the speaker 
contributes nothing to his persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost af-
firm that his character [ethos] is the most potent of all the means to persuasion.39 
Aristotle’s position thereby rejects the notion of Isocrates, that ethos is a 
pre-existing character or reputation, and rather situates the character of the 
speaker in the speech itself, as an element of the discourse.40 To the extent that 
The Rhetoric was an attempt to systematize persuasion, ethos had to be ad-
dressed as something the speaker constructs in the speech, rather than some 
prior reputation:41 
 
36  ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 1, at xv. 
37  See Amossy, supra note 28, at 2 n.3 (emphasizing Aristotle’s discursive ethos). 
38  ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (1356a), in THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE: AN EXPANDED 
TRANSLATION WITH SUPPLEMENTARY EXAMPLES FOR STUDENTS OF COMPOSITION AND PUBLIC 
SPEAKING 8 (Lane Cooper trans., 1960) [hereinafter THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE] (altera-
tion in original). 
39  Id. at 8–9. 
40  See Perry S. Bechky, Lemkin’s Situation: Toward a Rhetorical Understanding of Geno-
cide, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 600 n.283 (2012) (“Kennedy explains: Aristotle thus does not 
include in rhetorical ethos the authority that a speaker may possess due to his position in 
government or society, previous actions, reputation for wisdom, or anything except what is 
actually contained in the speech and the character it reveals. Presumably, he would regard all 
other factors, sometimes highly important in the success of rhetoric, as inartistic; but he nev-
er says so.”); Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 30 (explaining that Aristotle “in 
effect re-locates the character of the speaker inside the speech, rendering the speaker ‘an el-
ement of the discourse itself, no longer simply its origin.’ In doing so, he points the way to a 
more modern view of ethos.”). 
41  Rideout explains that Aristotle 
[D]oes so partly because prior reputation (“previous opinion”) would be implied, but also be-
cause he wanted to emphasize what was in the speech, rather than what was external to it. Also, 
if Greek litigants represented themselves, they would often lack external authority; hence the 
importance of establishing character in the speech itself. 
Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 32; see also Craig R. Smith, Ethos Dwells Perva-
sively: A Hermeneutic Reading of Aristotle on Credibility, in THE ETHOS OF RHETORIC 1, 5 
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[T]he speaker must not merely see to it that his speech [as an argument] shall be 
convincing and persuasive, but he must [in and by the speech] give the right im-
pression of himself, and get his judge [audience] into the right state of mind. . . . 
[F]or in conducing to persuasion it is highly important that the speaker should 
evince a certain character, and that the judges should conceive him to be dis-
posed towards them in a certain way, and further, if possible, that the judges 
themselves should have a certain attitude towards him.42 
When addressing the qualities that instill ethos, Aristotle couched advice in 
terms of appearance,43 recommending that the orator evince “intelligence, 
character, and goodwill”44 and emphasizing that “[t]hat is a complete list of the 
possibilities. It necessarily follows that the speaker who is thought to have all 
these qualities [intelligence, character, and good will] has the confidence of his 
hearers.”45 
Because, in Aristotle’s view, ethos is situated in the speech, his advice on 
style emphasizes ethotic appeal.46 In addressing lexis, or style, Aristotle “af-
firms character as a rhetorical construct.”47 He emphasizes that, with regard to 
propriety, “[y]our language will be appropriate, if it expresses (1) emotion and 
(2) character, and if it is (3) in proportion with the subject.”48 With regard to 
the presentation of character through emotion and fact, he advises, “this display 
of the facts through these external signs will make your style appropriate to 
character [to the persons of your story], since each class of men, each type of 
disposition, has a language suited to it.”49 
With regard to style, Aristotle counseled: 
There is an opportune use, and an inopportune, for all these rules of style. A cor-
rective for every excess is the time-worn trick of self-criticism while you are 
speaking; the audience thinks that the style is right since the speaker evidently 
knows what he is doing. Further, it is best not to keep all the proportions going 
at once, or the hearer will not be deceived. [—He will see your artfulness, and 
be on his guard.]50 
Aristotle’s rejection of the artifice of the Sophists is reflected in his advice 
on presentation, noting that a speaker should “[p]resent yourself from the outset 
 
(Michael J. Hyde ed., 2004) [hereinafter Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively] (“[E]thos was 
about building the credibility of a speaker before an audience, not about the speaker’s inher-
ent worth.”). 
42  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 91 (1378a). 
43  See Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 32 (“Here Aristotle continues to step away 
from the tradition established by Isocrates—away from the speaker’s need to be good and 
toward the sufficiency of seeming to be good. And here again, Aristotle presents ethos as the 
product of rhetorical artifice, one where the speaker must ‘construct a view of himself.’ ”). 
44  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 92 (1378a). 
45  Id. 
46  See Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 33. 
47  Id.  
48  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 197 (1408a1). 
49  Id. at 198 (1408a3). 
50  Id. at 198 (1408b). 
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in a distinctive light, so that the audience may regard you as a person of this 
sort, your opponent as of that; only do not betray your design. It is easy to give 
the right impression.”51 So, ethos, in Aristotle’s rendering in The Rhetoric, is 
appearance, situated in the speech, rather than possession.52 
C. Cicero: Appearance and Possession 
Cicero expounded on the work of Aristotle, emphasizing the importance of 
projecting ethos. He advised that advocates should adopt “a mild tone, a coun-
tenance expressive of modesty, [and] gentle language . . . .”53 Like Aristotle, 
Cicero warned advocates against revealing their artifice, cautioning them 
against disclosing their true motives and advising them to project an image of 
“seeming to be dealing reluctantly and under compulsion with something you 
are really anxious to prove.”54 He provided advice on evincing ethos in speech, 
noting that: 
[M]uch is done by good taste and style in speaking, [so] that the speech seems to 
depict the speaker’s character. For by means of particular types of thought and 
diction, and the employment besides of a delivery that is unruffled and eloquent 
of good-nature, the speakers are made to appear upright, well-bred and virtuous 
men.55 
Notwithstanding this advice, which suggests ethos as appearance rather 
than possession, the Roman view of character presentation also had an element 
of possession for rhetorical ethos.56 As James May explains, Cicero’s view of 
 
51  Id. at 231 (1417b); see also Michael H. Frost, With Amici Like These: Cicero, Quintilian 
and the Importance of Stylistic Demeanor, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 5, 13 
(2006) (emphasizing, with respect to the quoted passage, “at the risk of appearing to encour-
age duplicity and trickery, Aristotle warned advocates against inadvertently betraying their 
manipulative intentions . . . .”). 
52  Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 34 (“Modern commentators almost wholly 
agree that Aristotle moved his view of ethos beyond the traditional sense—of ethos as a 
quality of the speaker’s actual character, something that would attach to reputation—to 
something that is much more a matter of rhetorical competence, established not through rep-
utation but rather within the speech itself.”); see also Janja Žmavc, The Ethos of Classical 
Rhetoric: From Epieikeia to Auctoritas, in TOPICAL THEMES IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY: 
TWENTY EXPLORATORY STUDIES 181, 184 (Frans. H. van Eemeren & Bart Garssen eds., 
2012) (“What is significant in Aristotle’s conceptualization of phronesis, arête and eunoia 
as a part of rhetorical ethos is the function that he assigns to this persuasion strategy—
when the speech is spoken in such way, a speaker becomes trustworthy.”). 
53  2 CICERO, DE ORATORE 182–83, in CICERO DE ORATORE 327, 329 (E.W. Sutton trans., 
1959). 
54  Id. at 329 (182). 
55  Id. at 329 (184) (emphasis added). 
56  Žmavc, supra note 52, at 186. Žmavc emphasizes the difference between Greek and Ro-
man orators. The author notes that “[t]he goal of a Greek speaker was more or less to con-
struct a credible self image within the speech and/or at the same time gain the goodwill of 
the audience. However, his preexisting image generally did not interfere with argumenta-
tion . . . .” Id. In contrast, 
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ethos was necessarily and “radically influenced and conditioned by the idio-
syncrasies of the sociopolitical environment of Republican Rome as well as by 
the demands of the Roman judicial system.”57 In Rome, character was an im-
portant and essential element of the social and political structure and was an 
inherent characteristic.58 Therefore, notwithstanding Cicero’s advice on evinc-
ing ethos, in the Roman view ethos was, in part, an immutable characteristic of 
a person.59 As a result, “[a]long with the adopted Greek ethotic elements, a 
character presentation of a Roman speaker is always a preexisting social cate-
gory that consists of entirely Roman elements as well.”60 
May addresses the specific way in which Cicero diverges from Aristotle 
vis-à-vis ethos: 
The ethos defined by Aristotle as an entechnic source of proof demands explica-
tion only within the context of the speech; it is neither the speaker’s authority 
nor his previous reputation, but the impression he makes during his speech, that 
inspires trust in his listeners. Such restrictions upon ethos would have been in-
comprehensible to a Roman steeped in the tradition of the mos maiorum, sur-
rounded by a nobility of rank, and influenced by the culture’s general assump-
tions concerning human nature and character. The Roman view is succinctly, if 
somewhat obliquely expressed by Cicero in De Oratore: “Feelings are won over 
by a man’s dignity (dignitas), achievements (res gestae), and reputation (existi-
matio)” (2.182). Aristotle’s conception of an ethos portrayed only through the 
medium of a speech was, for the Roman orator, neither acceptable nor ade-
quate.61 
In addition to the impact of Roman social and political construct on the 
ethos of Cicero, differences in the Roman and Greek advocacy practices also 
impacted the Ciceronian view of ethos. In Greece, litigants often represented 
themselves, occasionally hiring a logographer or speechwriter to prepare the 
 
[s]omething completely different is true for the so called Roman rhetorical ethos: as a rhetorical 
strategy it almost entirely consists of the speaker’s preexisting reputation and the authority that 
comes from it. In Roman judicial oratory this kind of rhetorical ethos was not only a part of ar-
gumentation, but often presented its main feature; in funeral oratory ethos presented the central 
and crucial element that substantiated the purpose of a funeral speech . . . . 
Id. 
57  JAMES M. MAY, TRIALS OF CHARACTER: THE ELOQUENCE OF CICERONIAN ETHOS 6 
(1988). 
58  Id. (emphasizing that “[c]haracter was an extraordinarily important element in the social 
and political milieu of Republican Rome” and that “[t]he Romans believed that character 
remains essentially constant in man and therefore demands or determines his actions.”). 
59  Id. (stressing that “[s]ince character does not evolve or develop, but rather is bestowed or 
inherited by nature,
 
an individual cannot suddenly, or at will, change or disguise for any 
lengthy period his ethos or his way of life; nor is it wise to attempt such alteration.”). 
60  Žmavc, supra note 52, at 187. 
61  MAY, supra note 57, at 9. 
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speech.62 In contrast, in Rome, litigants were more likely to be represented by 
an advocate.63 
As a result of this aspect of Greek advocacy practice, it is not surprising 
that Aristotle does not distinguish between speaker and client when addressing 
ethotic appeal.64 Cicero on the other hand does address such a distinction in the 
following passage, which is important in the consideration of ethos as either 
possessed or projected: 
A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters, principles, conduct and 
course of life, both of those who are to plead cases and of their clients, to be ap-
proved, and conversely those of their opponents condemned; and for the feelings 
of the tribunal to be won over, as far as possible, to goodwill towards the advo-
cate and the advocate’s client as well.65 
Cicero goes on in this passage to instruct the advocate in crafting the ethos 
of client, advocate, and opponent, emphasizing an intersection of ethotic pos-
session and appearance: “Now feelings are won over by a man’s merit, 
achievements or reputable life, qualifications easier to embellish, if only they 
are real, than to fabricate where nonexistent.”66 Notwithstanding this emphasis 
on possession, he provides instruction on the presentation of ethotic appeal: 
But attributes useful in an advocate are a mild tone, a countenance expressive of 
modesty, gentle language, and the faculty of seeming to be dealing reluctantly 
and under compulsion with something you are really anxious to prove. It is very 
helpful to display the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty and a 
disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous, and all the qualities be-
longing to men who are upright, unassuming and not given to haste, stubborn-
ness, strife or harshness, are powerful in winning goodwill, while the want of 
them estranges it from such as do not possess them; accordingly the very oppo-
sites of these qualities must be ascribed to our opponents.67 
 
62  Id. at 9–10 (noting that such a practice posed challenges including that of “composing a 
speech that would prove not only persuasive in its argument but also appropriate and con-
sistent with the litigant’s character.”). 
63  Id. at 10 (explaining that, in Rome, “a more common practice was to enlist one or several 
patroni to plead the case.”). 
64  See JAKOB WISSE, ETHOS AND PATHOS: FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 32 (1989). Wisse as-
serts that “Aristotle supposes the speaker to be the litigant himself, and never mentions 
(ethos of) clients. This reflects the basic situation in Athenian court practice, where one was 
supposed to speak for oneself, even if there were many situations in which the use of an ad-
vocate was permitted.” Id. 
65  2 CICERO, supra note 53, at 327 (182); see also WISSE, supra note 64, at 229. Wisse trans-
lates the same passage as follows: 
Well then, it is a very important contribution to winning a case that approval should be given to 
the character, the habits, the deeds and the life, both of those who plead the case and of those on 
whose behalf they plead, and that these characteristics of the opponents are likewise disapproved 
of; and that the minds of the audience are, as much as possible, won over to feel sympathy to-
wards the orator as well as towards the person the orator is speaking for. 
66  2 CICERO, supra note 53, at 327 (182). 
67  Id. at 327, 329 (182–83). Wisse offers a similar translation: 
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May explains how such Roman oratory customs, coupled with the Roman 
emphasis on both appearance and possession of ethos, resulted in a dizzying 
array of points for ethotic emphasis.68 Noting that, within this passage, “the 
extension of the sphere of ethos is . . . striking,” May explains how the “realm 
of ethos” extends to “the characters of the patronus, the client, the adversary, 
his patronus, and the judges as well.”69 By way of this extension, “[a]ctors and 
opportunities for artistic variation have multiplied.”70 
Cicero thus “present[s] rhetorical ethos as a ‘confluence of notions of a 
speaker’s social role’ and as a ‘synthesis of’ several Greek and traditional 
Roman ‘concepts that interact in different ways.’ ”71 This observation, that 
rhetorical ethos can be viewed from the perspective of a variety of personas 
and from the interaction between those personas, leads to our next inquiry 
which is, where does ethos dwell? 
II. ETHOS IN THE CLASSICAL VIEW: DWELLING PLACE? 
An examination of the location of ethos, or the inquiry into where ethos 
lives or dwells, seems reasonable, as German philosopher Martin Heidegger 
asserted that the Aristotelian notion of ethos as character had a more primal an-
cestry in ethos as haunt, or dwelling place.72 While a philosophical considera-
 
[T]he effect of these things is enhanced by a mild tone of voice on the part of the orator, the in-
timation of restraint by the expression on his face, and kindliness in the use of his words: and, if 
you press some point somewhat vigorously, by seeming to act against your inclination, because 
you are forced to do so. It is very useful that signs should be given of flexibility, magnanimity, 
mildness, respectfulness, gratefulness, of not being desirous or greedy; and all these things typi-
cal of people decent and unassuming, not severe, not obstinate, not litigious, not harsh, really 
win sympathy, and alienate the audience from such as do not possess them. And these same con-
siderations must likewise be employed to ascribe the opposite qualities to the opponents. 
WISSE, supra note 64, at 229–30. Wisse acknowledges but disputes competing interpreta-
tions. Id. at 232 (describing one approach as “implausible from the start.”); see also MAY, 
supra note 57, at 10. May’s interpretation of this passage includes the following advice: 
A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters, principles, deeds and course of life, both of 
those who are to plead cases and of their clients, to be approved, and conversely those of their 
opponents condemned; and for the feelings of the judges to be won over, as far as possible, to 
goodwill towards the advocate and the advocate’s client as well. 
68  See MAY, supra note 57, at 10. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  Žmavc, supra note 52, at 189 (citation omitted) (asserting further that “such an interac-
tion of concepts, which extends from different social roles to diverse discursive practices 
and theoretical models of ancient rhetoricians and philosophers, is perhaps the best way to 
understand rhetorical ethos.”). 
72  Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 12. The authors explain, “From the Homeric ‘habitats 
of horses,’ Heidegger carries ethos into the ‘abodes of men,’ where Being is revealed, 
known, cared for, and preserved.” See Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively, supra note 41, at 2. 
Smith asserts that: 
For Aristotle, it is a given: everyone has ethos whether it be noble or ignoble. Before one even 
speaks, that ethos has an ontological dimension because it emerges from the way one makes de-
cisions, the way one lives on a day-to-day basis, the way one dwells. . . . Thus, Aristotle assumes 
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tion of ethos as being is beyond the scope of this Article, this Article’s interest 
in developing ethos in written communication does warrant a consideration of 
the location or dwelling place of ethos. This raises the following questions: 
Does ethos reside in the speaker/writer? In the speech/text? Or in the exchange 
between speaker/writer and audience? 
Similarly exploring these questions, in “Positioning Ethos in/for the Twen-
ty-First Century: An Introduction to Histories of Ethos,” James Baumlin and 
Craig Meyer raise the following inquiries: 
[C]ontemporary theory—as reflected in textual criticism, media and communi-
cation studies, gender studies, law, theology, anthropology, sociology, psychol-
ogy, ethics, politics, economics, even ecology—continues the fight over mean-
ings and applications. Is ethos a verbal behavior or the “dwelling place” that 
contains such behavior? Does it belong to the speaker or to the audience (or to 
both, or to neither)? Does it dwell in the space “between” rhetor and audience? 
Is it a directed, symbolic action or a dialogic transaction? Is it revealed or con-
structed by means of speech? (Does it pre-exist speech? Does it “exist” at all?)73 
Baumlin and Meyer point to the troublesome issue of language and transla-
tion, noting that, as with many Greek terms, there is no definitive translation 
for ethos.74 Consequent ambiguity has given rise to myriad interpretations, 
ranging from “rational ethos,”75 “ethos of sympathy,”76 “generative ethos,”77 
 
the knowledge of the Athenian fore-structure of ethos as a dwelling place and then reformulates 
the notion of dwelling place to present a rhetorical understanding of ethos. 
73  Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 4. 
74  Id. (“Like many terms from Greek philosophy (logos, pistis, kairos, to give a few) ethos 
remains untranslatable in any word-for-word correspondence.”) (The authors note, “Numer-
ous terms gesture in its direction, though no one word or phrase captures its nuances in Eng-
lish. Character, authority, charisma, credence, credibility, trust, trustworthiness, sincerity, 
‘good sense,’ goodwill, expertise, reliability, authenticity, subjectivity, ‘the subject,’ self, 
selfhood, self-identity, image, reputation, cultural identity, habit, habitus, habituation, per-
son, persona, impersonation, performance, self-fashioning, voice, personal style: these make 
for a sampling of stand-in terms.”); see also WISSE, supra note 64, at 6. Wisse addressed 
possible connections between logos, ethos, and pathos, initially asserting that logos connects 
with the message, pathos connects with the effect of the message on the audience, and ethos 
connecting with the speaker. Id. Nonetheless, he found such lines difficult to maintain. Thus, 
reflecting on the proposed differentiations, Wisse then posed the following questions, which 
align well with those this Article considers: 
(i) Is ethos concerned with the character of the speaker only (whether he is speaking for himself 
or on behalf of someone else), or is it extended to cover the client’s character also for cases 
where the speaker is an advocate? 
(ii) What qualities of the speaker (and client) fall under the scope of ethos? 
(iii) Is there any connection between ethos and pathos? 
(iv) Besides positive character-drawing regarding speaker (and client), does ethos comprise its 
negative counterpart regarding the opponent(s)? 
Id. at 7. 
75  Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 4 (citing WISSE, supra note 64). 
76  Id. (citing WISSE, supra note 64). 
77  Id. (citing Jim W. Corder, Varieties of Ethical Argument, With Some Account of the Sig-
nificance of Ethos in the Teaching of Composition, 6 FRESHMAN ENG. NEWS 1 (1978)). 
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“ethos of citizenship,”78 “scientific ethos,”79 “cyborg ethos,”80 “narrative 
ethos,”81 “intertextual ethos,”82 “photographic ethos,”83 “feminist ethos,”84 
“queer ethos,”85 and “ethos of the subaltern.”86 
Notwithstanding this array of ethotic possibility, Baumlin and Meyer 
acknowledge that, in connection with the listed concepts above, there are “pat-
terns” to these varied inquiries: “Some terms point to the existential compo-
nents of ethos; some to its sociological/cultural expressions; some to its linguis-
tic/discursive praxis.”87 The authors point out that:  
[A]ny adequate “map” or model of ethos will include a version of self and of its 
relation to culture and language. Equally important is the insight that each theo-
ry orients itself from (and, in so doing, privileges) one of three perspectives: that 
of self, or of culture, or of language.88 
The range of these conceptualizations suggests that one cannot—and likely 
should not—situate ethos definitively. 
This Article therefore will not ultimately land on a definitive “place” for 
ethos to dwell or to be situated, but, again, the inquiry is not for naught. Be-
cause, after all, “[t]he question to be answered is not ‘how do we get beyond 
these theories to the truth they aspire to . . . ?’ but ‘what do the debates and 
theories themselves tell us about where we are placed in the history of culture 
and meaning-making?’ ”89 With that flexibility (and freedom) in mind, this Ar-
ticle will consider what both classic and modern scholars have to say about the 
potential dwelling places of ethos, including the ethos in the speaker/writer, in 
the speech/document, and in the exchange between speaker/writer and the au-
dience. 
 
78  Id. (citing STEPHEN K. WHITE, THE ETHOS OF A LATE-MODERN CITIZEN (2009)). 
79  Id. (citing ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1973)). 
80  Id. (citing Michael W. DeLashmutt, Posthumanism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND 
FILM 354–61 (2011)). 
81  Id. (citing LIESBETH KOTHALS ALTES, ETHOS AND NARRATIVE INTERPRETATION: THE 
NEGOTIATION OF VALUES IN FICTION (2014)). 
82  Id. (citing John Oddo, The Chief Prosecutor and the Iraqi Regime: Intertextual Ethos and 
Transitive Chains of Authority, in INTERTEXTUALITY AND THE 24-HOUR NEWS CYCLE: A DAY 
IN THE RHETORICAL LIFE OF COLIN POWELL’S U.N. ADDRESS 45–76 (2014)). 
83  Id. (citing Kristie S. Fleckenstein, A Reformer Rides: Radical Photographic Ethos in 
Frances E. Willard’s A Wheel within a Wheel, in RETHINKING ETHOS: A FEMINIST 
ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO RHETORIC 26–49 (Kathleen J. Ryan et al. eds., 2016)). 
84  Id. (citing Valerie Palmer-Mehta, Andrea Dworkin’s Radical Ethos, in RETHINKING 
ETHOS: A FEMINIST ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO RHETORIC 50–70 (Kathleen J. Ryan et al. 
eds., 2016)). 
85  Id. (citing STACEY WAITE, THE UNAVAILABLE MEANS OF PERSUASION: A QUEER ETHOS 
FOR FEMINIST WRITERS AND TEACHERS 71–88 (Kathleen J. Ryan et al. eds., 2016)). 
86  Id. (citing Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271–313 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988)). 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. at 3. 
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A. Ethos in the Speaker 
As noted in the initial inquiry, modern and classical rhetoricians consid-
ered ethos as either possessed within or projected by the speaker. Here, this Ar-
ticle will further explore classical and contemporary notions of ethos as an as-
pect of the speaker/writer, as an aspect of the speech/text, and as an aspect or 
product of the exchange between speaker/writer and audience. The reader will 
see, however, that clear demarcations between these posited loci are difficult to 
maintain. 
1. Classical Notions of Ethos in the Speaker 
To trace a component of ethos in the actual character of the speaker, this 
Article must return to Isocrates, for whom ethos was prediscursive and was a 
person’s character, rather than something a person projected during the 
speech.90 In Isocrates’s view, “discourse becomes entirely an index of the indi-
vidual’s moral health and is gauged not simply by the way one speaks but by 
the way one lives.”91 And, while Cicero clearly allows for the appearance of 
ethos rather than possession, suggesting his target for the location of ethos 
would be more squarely in the speech, Roman culture and its emphasis on the 
credibility and immutability of reputation would suggest that ethos also dwells 
in the speaker.92 
2. Contemporary Notions of Ethos in the Speaker/Writer 
Modern commentators have also examined prediscursive ethos in the char-
acter of the speaker, or self, in the context of ethos.93 These contemporary 
views, however, further cloud the distinction between speaker/writer and 
speech/text. 
 
90  Michael J. Hyde, Introduction to THE ETHOS OF RHETORIC xv (Michael J. Hyde ed., 
2004). Hyde explains, “For Isocrates, rhetorical paideia, education and socialization, serves 
the process of character development, but it is a person’s character itself, his stellar reputa-
tion, that anchors the persuasive capacity of rhetoric.” Id. (emphasis added). 
91  ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 1, at xv. 
92  See WISSE, supra note 64, at 245 (“[E]specially for a Roman, authority is part of most of 
the attributes enumerated in the [De Oratore]: ‘character, habits, deeds and life,’ [and] ‘a 
man’s worth, the things he has done, and an evaluation of his life.’ ”); supra Section I.C. 
Wisse explains, “Of course, social authority played a much more important part in Roman 
culture and society, where personal relations were often decisive factors in the course of 
events, than in the democratic state of Athens, where such relations, if too openly used, were 
often regarded with suspicion.” WISSE, supra note 64, at 245. Nonetheless, “[s]ince rhetori-
cal theory, however, is in principle meant for all kinds of speakers, it is natural that the stress 
should lie upon the means to apply ethos that are afforded by the speech itself, as, indeed, it 
does in the last part of Cicero’s treatment . . . .” Id. Wisse therefore concludes that 
“[a]uthority that is already present should therefore be regarded as a part of Cicero’s concept 
of ethos.” Id. at 245–46. 
93  See Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 3–7, 10–12, 22. 
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a. Institutional Authority 
Scholars have situated prediscursive ethos in the institutional authority of 
the speaker/writer.94 In other words, in the character of the writer as derived 
from the writer’s institutional position and the stereotype the audience associ-
ates with that authority.95 
Ruth Amossy considers ethos through the lens of “rhetoric, pragmatics, 
and sociology.”96 Drawing on notions of stereotype,97 Amossy argues that the 
ethotic appeal of the speaker is constructed by the speaker who evinces an au-
thoritative self and who also adapts her persona to the values and expectations 
of the audience.98 In this way, Amossy does not limit ethos to the projected au-
thority of the speaker—for our purposes, she does not limit ethotic appeal only 
to the speaker. Rather, she finds ethotic appeal in the “crossroads,” both in the 
authority constructed by the speaker and in the active processing of information 
by the audience, which uses stereotype to call upon the ethos that exists within 
those stereotypes.99 This results in what Amossy refers to as both discursive 
authority and prediscursive institutional ethos.100 
The institutional ethos derives from the institutional position of the speaker 
and the authority associated with that position—in her view, the person author-
 
94  See, e.g., Amossy, supra note 28, at 9 (emphasizing that “[i]t is thus important to see how 
the prior ethos, and the discursive ethos that integrates and reworks it, are related to the au-
thority derived from an exterior institutional status.”). 
95  Id. at 7–9. 
96  Id. at 2 (“[T]he theory linking the efficacy of speech to the authority and credibility of the 
orator traverses disciplines: it is to be found at the crossroads of rhetoric, pragmatics, and 
sociology.”). 
97  See id. at 7 (“Stereotyp[e] consists of perceiving and understanding the real through a 
preexistent cultural representation, a fixed collective schema.”). 
98  Id. at 8. Amossy explains, “the construction of the image of self which confers on the dis-
course a considerable part of its authority [is based on] [t]he orator adapt[ing] his or her self-
presentation to collective schemas which he or she believes are ratified and valued by the 
target public.” Id. 
99  Id. at 4–7 (explaining that “the institutional position of the orator and the degree of au-
thority which this confers upon him contribute to the eliciting of a prior ethos. This prior 
ethos, as part of the audience’s encyclopedic knowledge, is mobilized by the oral or written 
speech in a specific situation of utterance.”). Id. at 19. Amossy’s model of ethos in the cross-
roads thus synthesizes pragmatic and sociological theories of ethos: 
Within this framework, a rhetorical analysis that examines the ethos as a discursive, interactional 
construction hinges on both pragmatics and sociology. Pragmatics allows the analysis to work 
within discourse and to analyze the construction of ethos in terms of enunciation, of genre, and 
of verbal strategies. Sociology allows the analysis to underscore not only the social dimension of 
the discursive ethos (the collective representation), but also its relation to external institutional 
positions. A continuum is established, with the inevitable breaks in level, between the speaker 
inside the discourse and the prior image of the speaker linked with his name and his position in a 
particular field. The discursive construction, the social imaginary, and the institutional authority 
contribute, then, to construct a suitable ethos. 
Id. at 20–21. 
100  See id. at 9, 19. 
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ized to hold the skeptron.101 In this way, Amossy is able to synthesize and ex-
tend the notions of prior reputational, prediscursive ethos espoused by Isocrates 
and implied by Cicero with the Aristotelian notion of discursive ethos. 
b. Historical Author 
Related to the authority a speaker/writer enjoys as a result of his or her in-
stitutional position, and the audience’s recognition of that institutional authori-
ty, modern theorists also consider the ethotic appeal of a known, actual au-
thor.102 Referencing the work of Amossy, Carmen Marimón Llorca discusses 
ethotic appeal in a particular form of journalism—columns on language.103 
Llorca differentiates between the prediscursive ethotic appeal associated with 
the known reputation of the author, and the discursive resources employed by 
the authors to substantiate their opinions in the columns.104 Llorca refers to the 
prediscursive ethos as the “empirical subject,” or the “personal and curricular 
values owned by the speaker before the discourse that should help him before 
the defense of a specific matter.”105 
Jim Corder has written extensively on ethos,106 seeking to situate ethotic 
appeal in the character of the writer.107 Differentiating his position on ethos 
from that of the post-structuralists and deconstructionists who argued that text 
has no meaning until such is made by the reader,108 Corder reminds scholars 
 
101  Id. at 3. Amossy explains, “Within this framework ethos occupies a determinate place, 
but it no longer qualifies as a discursive construction. It merges with the skeptron held out in 
Homer to the one who is to speak next.” Id. 
102  See, e.g., Carmen Marimón Llorca, Rhetorical Strategies in Discourses about Language: 
The Persuasive Resources of Ethos, 2016 RES RHETORICA 68, 68 (explaining that column-
ists, or historical authors, may have credibility as experts). 
103  See generally id. Llorca explains that columns on language are “texts published on a 
regular basis and signed by the same author where a variety of issues related to language are 
presented with an informative approach.” Id. at 68. 
104  See id. at 74–77. 
105  Id. at 75. 
106  See, e.g., Jim W. Corder, Hunting for Ethos Where They Say It Can’t Be Found, 7 
RHETORIC REV. 299, 299–300 (1989). 
107  See id. at 300–02, 307–10, 313–14. 
108  Id. at 301. Corder explains that authors 
have been, whether knowingly or not, whether directly or not, part of a 2500-year-old tradition 
that allowed and encouraged us to believe that ethos is in the text, that authors do exist, that they 
can be in their words and own them even in the act of giving them away. 
Id. In contrast, 
[n]ow literary theorists both compelling and influential tell us that it is not so, that ethos exists if 
at all only in the perceiving minds of readers, that authors, if they exist, do so somewhere else, 
not in their words, which have already been interpreted by their new owners. Language is or-
phaned from its speaker; what we once thought was happening has been disrupted. Authors, first 
distanced, now fade away into nothing. Not even ghosts, they are projections cast by readers. 
Id. 
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that someone had to “f[ind] the words.”109 Repositioning the importance of 
writer for the dwelling place of ethotic appeal, Corder therefore asserts: 
Ethos as we once thought we knew it is lost, and not. We’re all word-finders. 
We make ethos from the words we find, and some word-finder is always leaving 
words for us to find, telling an ethos toward us, crowding living time into com-
posing time into our reading time, trying to become somebody in the midst of a 
crowd, trying to get caught in language in front of others.110 
Similarly examining self-representation of the author in writing, Roger 
Cherry posits a distinction between ethos and persona.111 Cherry acknowledges 
the historical author and maintains that “[t]he question of ethos in the literary 
text should focus on the image of the historical author that emerges from the 
text itself.”112 Thus, Cherry’s position, like that of Amossy, Llorca, and Corder, 
blends prediscursive and discursive notions of ethos, blurring the line between 
speaker/author and speech/text. 
B. Ethos in the Speech/Text 
Because the dwelling of ethos cannot be neatly cabined in the speak-
er/writer, it must also be considered a part of the speech/text. Here, this Article 
will consider what classical rhetoricians advise with respect to projecting ethos 
in the speech and how modern rhetoricians envision ethos within a text. 
1. Classical Notions of Ethos in the Speech 
While Isocrates emphasized prediscursive ethos—that possessing good 
character was essential to ethos—his rhetorical instruction did focus on both 
developing good character and essential oratory skills.113 As Christopher 
Rideout explains, “Paramount among these skills was the ability to speak and 
persuade: ‘The gods have given us speech—the power which has civilized hu-
man life; shall we not strive to make the best use of it?’ ”114 
Aristotle, in contrast, emphasized discursive ethos—that aspect of persua-
sion that exists when the audience understands the character of the speaker 
through the speech.115 He therefore emphasized the importance of projecting 
 
109  See id. at 309–10. He explains, “[b]efore and after the interpretive community has done 
its work, before and after we have socially constructed, before and after we have intertextu-
alized, before and after readers have responded, someone has found the words.” Id. 
110  Id. at 312. 
111  See, e.g., Roger D. Cherry, Ethos Versus Persona: Self-Representation in Written Dis-
course, 15 WRITTEN COMM. 384, 385 (1998). 
112  Id. at 396. 
113  See Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 26–30. 
114  Id. at 27 (quoting James J. Murphy, The Origins and Early Development of Rhetoric, in 
A SYNOPTIC HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 12 (James J. Murphy ed., 1983)). 
115  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 8 (1356a1) (“The character [ethos] of the 
speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him worthy of be-
lief[.]”) (first alteration in original). In Ethos Dwells Pervasively: A Hermeneutic Reading of 
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“intelligence, [moral] character, and good will.”116 Cicero also emphasized the 
importance of the speech, noting that “much is done by good taste and style in 
speaking, [so] that the speech seems to depict the speaker’s character.”117 
2. Contemporary Notions of Ethos in the Speech/Text 
Here, again, it is difficult to clearly differentiate between speech/text and 
speaker/writer. Nonetheless, examining ethotic appeal in the speech/text pro-
vides insight for crafting the framework or template for ethos-based rhetorical 
strategy. 
a. Discoursal Self 
Considering voice or self in legal texts, Rideout explores ethos and the 
complexity of differentiating between speaker/writer and speech.118 
Ethos was originally a feature of spoken rhetorics, and part of the ethos of the 
spoken word would literally be the actual voice of the speaker. But ethos also 
included a sense of a figurative, or constructed, voice—closely tied to the literal 
voice, but not quite the same—because of the need for the orator to manipulate 
the actual speaking voice. Thus, the classical concept of ethos helped to open the 
way for a dual concept of voice and of the self that lay behind it.119 
Rideout posits that both voice and ethos in legal writing should be under-
stood in a discoursal context considering the self as constructed through the 
text.120 While Rideout acknowledges the historical author as the “ ‘real’ person 
who lies behind the writing,”121 he asserts that ethos emerges from the dis-
coursal representation of the historical author, existing “within the words.”122 
 
Aristotle on Credibility, Craig R. Smith explains that a reading of The Rhetoric, informed by 
a consideration of Nicomachean Ethics, “leads to the conclusion that ethos is pervasive in 
the speaking event. The Rhetoric advises speakers to establish character in the proem, epi-
logue, and narrative of a speech liberating it from the limits placed on it in other hand-
books.” Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively, supra note 41, at 13–14. Smith explains that “Ar-
istotle’s treatment of the narrative was a major advancement for the theory of ethos because 
he recommends that speakers utilize the narrative to ‘mention whatever bears on your own 
virtue . . . or bears on the opponent’s wickedness.’ ” Id. at 14. 
116  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 92 (1378a). 
117  Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 101 (1994) [here-
inafter Frost, Legal Audience] (emphasis added). 
118  See J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 67, 76 (2009). 
119  Id. (citation omitted). 
120  Rideout, Discoursal Self, supra note 29, at 42 (considering the self “constructed through 
the discourse characteristics of a text.”) (citation omitted). 
121  Id. at 41. 
122  Id. at 42 (explaining that “[a]lthough readers commonly believe that the self that emerges 
from the words in the text is the real self of the author, within this model, that self that 
emerges is the discoursal self.”). 
20 NEV. L.J. 877 
896 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
b. Persona/Mask 
As noted, this interplay between writer, text, and audience reveals that, in 
contemporary thought, situating the dwelling of ethos exclusively in the writer, 
or in the character of writer revealed in text, is a difficult line to draw. Using a 
definition of self as “character as it emerges in language,”123 Baumlin and 
Meyer posit an existential ethos124 explaining, “[b]y ‘character,’ we assume 
both personhood and persona—that is, the self’s expressive self-identity as well 
as its social presentation or mask.”125 The authors assert that such a conceptual-
ization involves a “double movement, . . . which introjects how one ‘sees’ one-
self, as well as projects how one ‘is seen’ by others.”126 And where the speaker 
or writer is acting on behalf of another—a client, for example, in the Ciceroni-
an context—one might consider a triple movement of projecting for oneself in 
both an inward and outward manner while also projecting on behalf of anoth-
er.127 
Cherry similarly considers the notion of persona, or mask, in the context of 
ethos. He differentiates between ethos, which is connected to but distinguisha-
ble from the historical author, and persona.128 Persona, in Cherry’s view, is a 
“stylized mask.”129 Cherry explains that when writers craft persona in the text, 
they “exercise their ability to portray the elements of a rhetorical situation to 
their advantage by fulfilling or creating a certain role (or roles) in the discourse 
community in which they are operating.”130 
Similarly blurring the line between author and text, Corder addresses ethos 
as dwelling in the text, examining the text for traces of the author.131 Corder 
asserts that he wants to “believe that ethos is in the text, . . . to believe that [he] 
 
123  Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 6 (citation omitted). 
124  Id. at 4. Baumlin and Meyer consider: 
[A]n existentialist presumption of an ontology of self, which “expresses” or reveals itself by 
language. Within this model, the self is real—a being-in-the-world. It may need language to re-
veal itself, but its existence precedes discourse. Giving the “essential nature” of the self, an exis-
tentialist model seeks an ethos of “authenticity.” 
Id. at 4–5 (citations omitted). 
125  Id. at 6. 
126  Id. The authors explain: 
One hopes for sincerity, authenticity, and self-consistency in this doubled, inside/outside “show-
ing-forth” of character. When inside and outside match, one can speak of ethos as self-
revelation: “what you see is what you get.” But there can be a slippage or disjunction between 
the person and persona—again, between the inner and the outer versions of self. In that case, one 
can speak of ethos as performance. 
Id. 
127  Complicating this a bit further and as discussed, Cicero also acknowledged the concept 
of developing the ethos of both the speaker and, where the speaker represents a client, the 
ethos of the client. See generally supra Section I.C. 
128  See generally Cherry, supra note 111. 
129  Id. at 396. 
130  Id. at 399. 
131  See Corder, supra note 106, at 301. 
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could find others in their texts so that [he] might hope to exist for others in [his] 
text so that [he] might turn [him]self over to them and thereby survive in the 
text [he] leave[s].”132 
Modern commentators also consider the notion of ethos being constructed 
through both the speech and its impact on the audience.133 So, for example, a 
social-constructionist perspective on ethos “privileges culture over self”134 and 
examines the speaker as “constructed by language,” but also by “other modes 
of cultural-symbolic communication/participation.”135 This socially constructed 
self is a performance, a “mask,” and in this perspective, “ethos gives the ‘roles’ 
and ‘rules’ of the socially-constructed self.”136 
The idea of a socially constructed self, one that exists through language 
(speech), but also through dialogue with audience,137 reminds us that the cul-
tural context is essential to a consideration of the dwelling of ethos.138 This Ar-
ticle must therefore turn to an examination of ethos in the space between the 
speaker and the speech—ethos in the exchange between speaker/speech and 
audience. 
C. Ethos in the Exchange 
Both classical and contemporary notions of ethos contribute to views of 
ethos in the “exchange.” Those sources may also yield some insight into this 
posited location or dwelling, but in using these theories in a practical applica-
tion, the notion of audience becomes a bit more comprehensive in contempo-
rary rhetorical analysis.139 While this complicates things a bit, this Article will 
 
132  Id. at 314. With regard to his own character in text, Corder boldly announces, “I’m in 
here. Shall I provide documentation? Are telephone numbers needed? Letters of reference? 
Will the testimony of wife, librarian, and bartender suffice?” Id. 
133  See, e.g., Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 5. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. (citations omitted). Baumlin and Meyer explain, “Here the self has no meaning—no 
‘being’—outside of its cultural container; and, since the self ‘enacts itself’ within specific 
roles and behaviors, its ‘nature’ (if such a term applies here) arises in performance. The self, 
in this sense, is a mode of personation—a mask.” Id. 
137  See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 328. Reynolds argues that the socially constructed self 
“shifts its implications of responsibility from the individual to a negotiation or mediation 
between the rhetor and the community.” She further asserts that such a shift is consistent 
with the etymology of ethos, which, “in addition to its meaning as character,” is “ ‘an accus-
tomed place’ and in the plural may refer to the ‘haunts or abodes of animals’; it also may 
refer to ‘the abodes of men.’ ” Id. at 327–28 (citing Arthur B. Miller, Aristotle on Habit 
(nOos) and Character (eOos): Implications for the Rhetoric?, 41 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 309, 
309–16 (1974)). 
138  See id. at 329 (“One identifies an individual’s character, then, by looking to the commu-
nity.”). 
139  See infra Section III.A. 
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ultimately use the foundation of potential loci for ethos, together with a broader 
conception of audience, to examine ethotic appeal in a modern text.140 
1. Classical Notions of Ethos in the Exchange 
Isocrates, Aristotle, and Cicero all must have acknowledged some aspect of 
ethos in the exchange between audience and speaker. For Isocrates, even 
though the concept of ethos was situated in the prior reputation of the speak-
er,141 the audience clearly must have had some awareness of this prior reputa-
tion and must have used that awareness to invoke the ethos of the speaker for 
this aspect of ethos to have been effective. Aristotle also acknowledged the 
two-dimensional or discoursal nature of persuasion, emphasizing that 
“ ‘[p]ersuasive’ means persuasive to a person.”142 
Indeed, Aristotle recognized this discoursal element of attending to the 
character of the audience and addressing ethos in the exchange as he describes 
character and audience in Book 3, emphasizing that style should be “appropri-
ate to character [to the persons of your story], since each class of men, each 
type of disposition, has a language suited to it.”143 He advised speakers to be 
familiar with different audiences so as to adapt to their peculiarities: 
Under ‘class’ I distinguish differences of age, as boy, man, or old man; of sex, 
as man or woman; of nationality, as Spartan or Thessalian. Under ‘dispositions’ 
I refer to those habits only which determine the character of a man’s life—for 
not every habit does this. Accordingly, if the speaker uses the words which be-
long to a type of life, he will reproduce its character; for a rustic will not say the 
same things as an educated man, nor talk in the same way. (To a certain extent 
an audience will be impressed by a device which speech-writers use to nauseous 
excess: ‘Who does not know . . . ?’ ‘We all know . . . ’ [t]he hearer, ashamed to 
be ignorant, agrees to the fact, so as to have his part in the common 
knowledge)[.]144 
 
140  See infra Section III.B. 
141  See supra Section I.A. 
142  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 11 (1356b) (emphasis added); see also 
KAREN BURKE LEFEVRE, INVENTION AS A SOCIAL ACT 45 (1987) (explaining that “Aristotle 
defines rhetoric as the art of finding the available means of persuasion, which means that it 
must involve others who are to be persuaded.”). Arguing that “Aristotle’s Rhetoric presup-
poses a social context,” LeFevre further notes that: 
The three kinds of proofs—ethos, logos, pathos—by which the rhetor persuades similarly pre-
suppose the existence of others who may or may not accept certain proofs. The audience is ac-
tively involved in building the argument in that the rhetor must look to the audience to supply 
the premises of the enthymemes on which the argument rests. 
Id. 
143  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 198 (1408a3) (alteration in original). 
144  Id.; see also Smith, Ethos Dwells Pervasively, supra note 41, at 13. Smith emphasizes, 
Thus, an audience has character or characters; it has an ethos of its own to which speakers must 
attend. In adapting, they enhance their own ethos; if they fail to adapt, their ethos will be dimin-
ished. Beyond that, however, speakers can move the audience to conform to the speaker’s ethos 
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Cicero too attended to the audience reception as related to ethotic appeal, 
advising advocates to calibrate their emotions to those they seek to invoke in 
their audience.145 
2. Contemporary Notions of Ethos in the Exchange 
Modern scholars questioning the loci of ethos have similarly considered 
ethos in the discourse or exchange.146 Considering the social, interactive nature 
of ethos, Nedra Reynolds emphasizes the role of community in developing 
ethos.147 Reynolds notes that “the concept of ethos was developed in a culture 
which engaged in spoken discourse, where the actual presence of an audience 
was assumed.”148 Suggesting that credibility is constructed in the “be-
tweens,”149 Quoting LeFevre, Reynolds explains “[i]n written composition, the 
social matrix of necessary others who form community and audience are less 
obvious, but nevertheless present. Ethos, we might say, appears in that socially 
created space, in the ‘between,’ the point of intersection between speaker or 
writer and listener or reader.”150 Examining the contours of the “between” 
space reveals content for the framework of ethotic appeal. 
 
and modify the audience’s habits and values. Such identification with a leader is difficult to 
achieve, but when accomplished, is the most powerful kind of persuasion. 
Id. 
145  2 CICERO, supra note 53, at 331 (185) (advising that “closely associated with this is that 
dissimilar style of speaking which, in quite another way, excites and urges the feelings of the 
tribunal towards hatred or love, ill-will or well-wishing, fear or hope, desire or aversion, joy 
or sorrow, compassion or the wish to punish . . . .”); see also Frost, Legal Audience, supra 
note 117, at 101. Frost explains, “ever mindful of the need to vary delivery depending on 
audience and purpose, Cicero also stressed that, in order to be convincing, advocates must 
sometimes abandon the restrained or temperate ethos and adopt instead the passionate emo-
tions they are trying to instill in their audience[.]” 
146  See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 2, at 326–27 (suggesting “places where responsible writ-
ers negotiate and construct ethos—sites both on the margins and from the ‘betweens.’ ”). 
147  Id. at 329 (stressing that an “individual’s ethos cannot be determined outside of the space 
in which it was created or without a sense of the cultural context.”). 
148  Id. at 333. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. (citing LeFevre, supra note 142, at 45–46). Reynolds emphasizes that “[l]ocating 
ethos in written texts requires attention to the mediation or negotiation that goes on in the 
spaces between writers and their locations, in ‘the tension between the speaker’s private and 
public self.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Reynolds therefore seeks to explore the analysis of ethos 
in the betweens, questioning: 
How might this idea of “the betweens” work in practice? I think it means attending to the rhetor-
ical strategies writers use to locate themselves, their texts, and the particular discursive commu-
nities they are mediating within and between. How do writers identify themselves, claim au-
thority, and position their projects? Are these self-identifications explicit, and if so, what is their 
effect? In the spirit of ethos as a negotiated space where authority is established within and be-
tween communities, I want to suggest that being explicit is also being responsible. 
Id. at 333–34. 
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a. Filters 
In the “exchange” space, the audience is making meaning of the ethos of 
the speaker/writer.151 Modern theorists have explained the various ways in 
which this construction of ethos in the between space is accomplished.152 
Asserting that the term ethos “embraces three components: the speaker or 
person to whom ethos and its qualities are assigned; the audience who per-
ceives or projects these qualities onto the speaker; and the ‘rhetorical scene,’ 
where the speaker (and, occasionally, audience) is situated in time and 
space[,]”153 Craig Meyer posits ethos in the exchange by exploring the relation-
ship between “an authentic, core self that abides beyond culture and its influ-
ences,” and the mask of cultural influences necessarily cloaking that self.154 
Meyer explains that these cultural masks operate as filters and influence how 
ethos is constructed between speaker/writer and audience.155 Asserting, there-
fore, that ethos exists in the conceptual “between” space, Meyer similarly em-
phasizes the social context of ethos. 
Baumlin and Meyer also consider post-structuralist notions of ethos situat-
ed between speaker and audience.156 Baumlin and Meyer note that “[i]n con-
temporary poststructuralist terms, the Aristotelian rhetor is reduced to an effect 
of language: exactly ‘who’ the speaker ‘is’ depends on how the audience 
‘reads’ him.”157 The authors thus explain the importance of audience and ex-
 
151  See, e.g., id. at 333. Reynolds explains: 
Locating ethos in written texts requires attention to the mediation or negotiation that goes on in 
the spaces between writers and their locations, in “the tension between the speaker’s private and 
public self.” Ethos, in fact, occurs in the “between” as writers struggle to identify their own posi-
tions at the intersections of various communities and attempt to establish authority for them-
selves and their claims. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
152  See supra Section II.C.2. 
153  Craig A. Meyer, From Wounded Knee to Sacred Circles: Oglala Lakota Ethos as 
“Haunt” and “Wound”, 8, 36 HUMAN. 1, 5 (2019). Despite these categorizations, Meyer 
nonetheless questions a clear demarcation between these loci for ethos, recognizing that, 
“[a]s an analytic method, the classical-Aristotelian model seeks to pin these components and 
categories down, as if ethos were reducible to the contents of a text.” Id. Notwithstanding, 
such an approach “takes Aristotle’s logocentric system as a recipe book complete in itself, 
neglecting the fact that his Rhetoric must itself be contextualized and historicized—that is, 
situated within its own time and place.” Id. at 6. 
154  Id. at 5. Meyer does acknowledge that the authentic self “wears culture as a mask of 
sorts.” Id. 
155  Id. Meyer explains, “[t]hrough the shutters of such masks, we see and are seen: they pro-
vide filters through which we comprehend the cultures we interact with and our respective 
roles therein. These masks—our personas—are means by which we present ourselves in the 
places where we situate ourselves.” Id. 
156  See Baumlin & Meyer, supra note 5, at 10 (“[E]thos ‘lies between’ the speaker and audi-
ence: belonging to neither wholly . . . .”). 
157  Id. The authors further explain, “Whether the rhetor deserves that trust remains an ethical 
question lying outside the text. And, within this radically textualized model, the ethics of 
ethos must ‘lie outside,’ since Aristotle’s Rhetoric undergirds an ethos of appearances.” Id. 
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change with regard to ethos existing within the rhetorical community, noting 
that “the rhetor’s ethos is built out of a speaker-audience interaction.”158 
b. Shared Knowledge 
Similar to filters, the concept of shared knowledge as discussed by Amossy 
suggests that meaning-making is often facilitated by knowledge that the speak-
er/writer and audience share.159 As noted, Amossy uses rhetorical, sociological, 
and pragmatic lenses to examine both discursive and authoritative aspects of 
ethos.160 From the sociological position of Pierre Bourdieu that “the power of 
words derives from the connection between the social function of the speaker 
and his or her discourse[,]”161 Amossy asserts that the ethotic appeal of speech 
is not situated in its content, but in the authority bestowed upon the speaker by 
the audience.162 In contrast to this social-function consideration of ethos, 
Amossy presents the pragmatists’s view of ethos as located “within verbal in-
teraction and . . . purely internal to discourse . . . .”163 
Amossy is nonetheless able to reconcile these seemingly conflicting views 
by incorporating rhetorical theory, which considers persuasion in the exchange 
between speaker and audience.164 Amossy, like the classical rhetoricians, 
acknowledges that argumentation (and persuasion) is a function of the orator 
calibrating her image to that of the audience, and vice versa.165 For Amossy, 
“the interaction between the orator and [her] audience is necessarily effected 
 
158  Id. at 10. The authors note: 
Those who dwell within a rhetorical community acquire their character as rhetorical participants 
from it, as it educates and socializes them. The community does this at least in part by supplying 
the Aristotelian components of ethos—the judgment (phronesis), values (arete), and feelings 
(eunoia) that make a rhetor persuasive to other members of the community. 
Id. at 11. 
159  Amossy, supra note 28, at 7 (explaining the importance of shared representations for 
ethotic appeal). 
160  Id. at 5. 
161  Id. at 3. 
162  Id. (“[T]he efficacy of speech does not depend on what it utters but on who is uttering it 
and on the power with which he or she is endowed by the public.”). Amossy explains that, in 
Bourdieu’s construction: 
[T]he saying can be a doing only within the logic of social interaction—a shift from speech acts 
to symbolic exchanges between participants who are social agents. An interactional perspective 
is thus adopted. An institutional perspective is adopted as well: the verbal exchange cannot be 
dissociated from the positions occupied by the participants in the field (religious, political, intel-
lectual, literary) within which they act. 
Id. 
163  Id. at 5. She explains, “[c]ontemporary pragmatics diverges from the sociologist’s per-
spective insofar as it researches the efficacy of speech inside verbal exchange. Its various 
trends are concerned not with social rituals outside of language practice but with enunciation 
frameworks.” Id. at 3. 
164  Id. at 5 (citing CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A 
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969)). 
165  Id. 
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through the image they form of each other [and] . . . proper functioning of the 
exchange demands that to the image of the audience, there corresponds an im-
age of the orator.”166 
Using stereotype theory to explain that “verbal construction ethos has an 
intrinsic social dimension,”167 Amossy asserts that speakers and their audiences 
construct images of one another based upon “perceiving and understanding the 
real through a preexistent cultural representation, a fixed collective schema.”168 
Thus, reconciling the interplay between the speaker’s choice of rhetorical de-
vices to construct a self in the speech and the prior authority of the speaker as 
constituting ethos, Amossy asserts, “[t]he question of whether it is the institu-
tional authority or the discursive construction that defines ethos is thus to be 
understood in terms of reciprocity and complementarity.”169 Ethos is therefore 
constructed in the exchange between the authoritative nature of the writer, the 
writer’s ability to project that ethos to the audience, and the audience’s ability 
to situate the construction of that ethos in a stock structure supported by stereo-
type.170 
In an attempt to reconcile classical with modern views on rhetoric, Andrea 
Lunsford and Lisa Ede posit what they refer to as a flawed distinction regard-
ing the rhetor-audience relationship.171 Focusing primarily on what they view 
as contemporary misapprehensions of Aristotle’s work,172 the authors challenge 
a modern interpretation of the artistic pisteis (ethos, pathos, and logos) as inde-
pendent means of persuasion.173 The authors assert that the pisteis are better 
understood as “inseparable strands that link people engaged in discourse.”174 
By uniting ethos, pathos, and logos in the enthymeme, the authors similarly 
reimagine the relationship between rhetor and audience as a “dynamic” one, 
 
166  Id. at 6. Amossy explains, “[t]he importance accorded to the audience naturally entails an 
emphasis on the values and norms outside of which any dialogue proves to be impossible. It 
is by drawing on common knowledge and beliefs that the orator attempts to make an inter-
locutor share his or her views.” Id. 5–6. 
167  Id. at 8–9. 
168  Id. at 7. Amossy explains, “[t]he conception that a speaker forms of the audience, wheth-
er correct or erroneous, regulates his or her endeavor to adapt to them[,] . . . [and] [t]he same 
applies to the construction of the image of self which confers on the discourse a considerable 
part of its authority.” Id. at 8. 
169  Id. at 12. 
170  Id. at 6–7. 
171  Lunsford & Ede, Classical Rhetoric, supra note 7, at 84. 
172  Id. at 86 (noting that “many current misconceptions grow out of a limited reading of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric.”). 
173  Id. at 88 (challenging a modern scholar’s assertion that “in classical rhetorical theory 
the pisteis ‘were viewed as autonomous. Each was considered as complete in itself, and 
as entirely capable of effecting conviction without the aid of the others.’ ” (citation omit-
ted)). 
174  Id. The authors rely on the work of W.M.A. Grimaldi in rejecting a conceptualization of 
the pisteis “as elements that can be added to discourse—rather like the ingredients in a 
recipe.” Id. (citing W.M.A. GRIMALDI, ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I, A COMMENTARY (1980); 
W.M.A. GRIMALDI, STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC (1972)). 
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explaining that “the goal of rhetoric is as an interactive means of discovering 
meaning through language.”175 They thus dispel a conceptualization of the rela-
tionship between rhetor and audience as “antagonistic and unidirectional,” as-
serting, in contrast, “enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience joint-
ly produce them . . . []they[] intimately unite speaker and audience and provide 
the strongest possible proofs.”176 They therefore conclude that both Aristotelian 
and modern theories view rhetoric “as providing a method by which rhetor and 
audience, a self and an other [sic], together create knowledge, most often by 
building on shared or prior knowledge.”177  
c. Source Relational Characteristics 
Elsewhere I have argued that ethos is a relationship of trust between audi-
ence and writer (or speaker), and that this necessarily involves an exchange be-
tween reader and writer.178 In many analyses of ethos in legal writing, the focus 
is on characteristics of the source that evince ethos.179 Source characteristics 
associated with ethos include “intelligence, character, and good will.”180 
“[W]riter[s] can demonstrate intelligence . . . by showing that [they are] in-
formed, adept at legal research, organized, analytical, deliberate, empathetic, 
practical, articulate, eloquent, precise, innovative.”181 Writers reveal character 
when they demonstrate “truthfulness, candor, zeal, respect, and professional-
ism.”182 Because good will is associated with the apparent motivation of the 
advocate, writers can evince good will by demonstrating “authority; consisten-
cy; fairness; and concern for, or similarity with, the audience.”183 
I have attempted to differentiate between attributes of ethos that reflect 
characteristics of the source, what I have labeled source-characteristic attrib-
utes, and aspects of ethos that reflect the relationship the author fosters with the 
audience, what I have labeled source-relational attributes.184 Both source-
 
175  Id. at 90–91. 
176  Id. at 91 (citing Lloyd F. Bitzer, Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited, 45 Q.J. SPEECH 399, 
408 (1959)). 
177  Id. at 95 (emphasis omitted). 
178  Melissa H. Weresh, Morality, Trust, and Illusion: Ethos as Relationship, 9 LEGAL 
COMM. & RHETORIC 229, 231 (2012); see also Anne E. Mullins, Source-Relational Ethos in 
Judicial Opinions, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1089, 1109 (2019) (exploring how judges 
evince source-relational attributes of ethos by using emotional intelligence). 
179  See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN 
PERSUASIVE WRITING 125–26 (2d ed., 2008) [hereinafter SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL 
WRITING]. 
180  THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at 92 (1378a). 
181  Weresh, supra note 178, at 233 (citing SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 
179, at 148). 
182  Id. (citing SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 179, at 125–26). 
183  Id. 
184  Id. at 234 (asserting that “[t]hese source-relational attributes implicate the source’s abil-
ity to connect with the audience in some manner, by creating a bond based on shared infor-
mation or by reinforcing a bond established between the source and the audience.”). 
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characteristic and source-relational attributes are evinced in the text. In my 
view, therefore, ethos dwells both in the text, in the source, and in the ex-
change. 
Llorca also examines discursive ethos as a product of the exchange, or re-
lationship between speaker/author and audience.185 Llorca explains that ethotic 
argumentation exists within a social and verbal space.186 Ethotic appeal “is ex-
pressed through words backed by the echo of a real individual, but transmitted 
by a strictly discursive self. It builds a discursive instance that supports the 
enunciation and, in turn, produces an alocutary, an ‘intralocutor’ with whom a 
communication space can be established.”187 Evidence of this ethotic appeal, in 
Llorca’s view, can be found in the prediscursive ethos of the empirical subject 
and in the rhetorical strategies writers employ to reveal their attitudes about 
their own roles and identities.188 Ethotic rhetorical strategies include personal 
deixis,189 sources cited by the writer, speech acts that reinforce the relationship 
between reader and writer, and evaluative judgments the writer makes regard-
ing content.190 To the extent that many of these strategies foster a relationship 
between the writer and the audience, they fall within what I refer to as source-
relational characteristics. 
As the foregoing examination suggests, ethos likely dwells in the speaker, 
the speech, and in the exchange between speaker and audience. The posited 
framework for ethotic appeal will consider all haunts to better understand how 
to evince ethos in order to enhance persuasion. But first, because the intended 
target is written communication, this Article must explore an additional, poten-
tial wrinkle in the use of classical rhetoric to examine contemporary legal writ-
ing: the concept of audience. 
III. CONTEMPORARY ETHOS IN WRITTEN COMMUNICATION 
Because this Article seeks to synthesize classical and modern notions of 
ethos to craft a framework for examining ethos-based rhetorical strategies in 
persuasive documents, it must consider the mobility of modern texts, as con-
trasted with the temporality of speech in classical times, and the corresponding 
 
185  See Llorca, supra note 102, at 77. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
188  See id. at 79–85. 
189  “Deixis is reference by means of an expression whose interpretation is relative to the 
(usually) extralinguistic context of the utterance, such as: who is speaking[,] the time or 
place of speaking[,] the gestures of the speaker[, and] the current location in the dis-
course[.]” Deixis, SIL GLOSSARY OF LINGUISTIC TERMS, https://glossary.sil.org/term/deixis  
[https://perma.cc/8LKV-ENJD] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). Person deixis is exhibited by the 
pronouns used to refer to the speaker, addressee, and other referents. Person Deixis, SIL 
GLOSSARY OF LINGUISTIC TERMS, https://glossary.sil.org/term/person-deixis [https://perma. 
cc/4V2P-44AF] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
190  See Llorca, supra note 102, at 81–85. 
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array of audience members given such mobility, in contrast with an actual and 
identifiable audience in classical times. Thus, further shrouding (or illuminat-
ing) the concept of ethos is the degree to which modern rhetoricians have con-
sidered the interplay between writer and audience. 
A. The Modern and Myriad Notions of Audience 
The concept of audience requires an initial disclaimer—the term itself has 
many meanings. As one scholar has recognized, this formally “stable referent 
. . . has become fractured into audiences, into a not-always-peaceable and too-
often-fragmented kingdom of terms, complete with colorful relatives, feuding 
rivals, strange bedfellows, and new arrivals turning up each month.”191 At the 
core of these consideration lies the distinction between real and fictional audi-
ences.192 These varied views also consider audience outside the text as well as 
inside the text.193 
Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford differentiate between the audience “ad-
dressed” and the audience “invoked.”194 With regard to the addressed audience, 
Ede and Lunsford point to “the concrete reality of the writer’s audience” and 
the ability of the writer to envision the “attitudes, beliefs, and expectations” of 
the audience.195 Thus, the concept of audience addressed correlates with the 
Aristotelian and Ciceronian notion of an actual, literal audience. 
The invoked audience, in contrast, is viewed as more of “a construction of 
the writer, a ‘created fiction.’ ”196 Thus, differentiating the invoked audience of 
the writer from the literal audience of a speaker, Ede and Lunsford explain that 
 
191  Jack Selzer, More Meanings of Audience, in A RHETORIC OF DOING: ESSAYS ON WRITTEN 
DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KINNEAVY 161 (Stephen P. Witte et al. eds., 1992). The 
overall complexity and resulting ambiguity surrounding the concept of audience can be illus-
trated by the following questions posed by Selzer: 
What exactly are the differences and relationships between “evoked” and “invoked” audiences? 
Or between “narratees” and “implied readers”? Or between “demographic” and “fictionalized” 
audiences? Or between “fictionalized,” “intended,” “ideal,” “inscribed,” and “universal” audi-
ences? What is the difference between “audience” and “discourse community”? What do tech-
nical writing textbooks mean by “multiple audiences”? Is it useful to conceive of audiences and 
readers as distinct entities? How do texts signal the differences among all of these characters? 
And how does one devise a pedagogy for “audience” that would improve reading and writing? 
Id. While Selzer offers his essay as an endeavor to address these questions and to “straighten 
out some of the current confusion that has converged about the term audience,” he acknowl-
edges his inability “to succeed completely in that endeavor,” emphasizing that “the issues 
are complex and slippery.” Id. 
192  See, e.g., Lisa Ede & Andrea Lunsford, Audience Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role 
of Audience in Composition Theory and Pedagogy, 35 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 155, 156 
(1984) [hereinafter Ede & Lunsford, Audience Addressed] (distinguishing between actual 
and imagined audiences). 
193  See Introduction to A RHETORIC OF DOING, supra note 191, at 13. 
194  See generally Ede & Lunsford, Audience Addressed, supra note 192. 
195  Id. at 156 (emphasizing that gaining this knowledge about the audience “is not only pos-
sible (via observation and analysis) but [is] essential.”). 
196  Id. at 160. 
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the concept of an invoked audience does “not, of course, deny the physical re-
ality of readers, but [underscores] that writers simply cannot know this reality 
in the way that speakers can.”197 In considering the readers in the invoked audi-
ence, Ede and Lunsford explain how the writer uses rhetorical strategies in the 
text to construct the role of the audience and its relationship to both writer and 
text.198 
Citing Walter Ong’s compelling essay “The Writer’s Audience is Always a 
Fiction,” Ede and Lunsford assert that, in Ong’s view and related to the in-
voked audience, “the writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or vague-
ly, an audience cast in some sort of role . . . [and] the audience must corre-
spondingly fictionalize itself.”199 Thus, while the invoked audience for writing 
deviates from the traditional rhetorical view of a literal audience in an oratory 
setting,200 it nonetheless is based upon the writer’s imagination of the audience 
and her attempts to connect with it through the text.201 
Building upon the work of Ede and Lunsford, Jack Selzer identifies three 
categories of audience as follows: “reader in the writer,” “reader in the text,” 
and “real readers.”202 The “reader in the writer” category includes both the “in-
tended audience” and the “universal audience.”203 The intended audience is the 
audience the writer envisions as he writes, and the one that therefore impacts 
the production of text.204 Selzer’s notion of universal audience is a broader 
construct, but also influential on the writer’s process. He describes the univer-
 
197  Id. 
198  Id. (explaining how the writer uses “semantic and syntactic resources of language to pro-
vide cues for the reader—cues which help to define the role or roles the writer wishes the 
reader to adopt in responding to the text.”). 
199  Id. (citation omitted). 
200  Id. at 161 (emphasizing that “the audience [of a writer] is not there in the sense that the 
speaker’s audience, whether a single person or a large group, is present.”). 
201  Id. at 167. Ede and Lunsford assert: 
[I]t is only through the text, through language, that writers embody or give life to their concep-
tion of the reader. In so doing, they do not so much create a role for the reader—a phrase which 
implies that the writer somehow creates a mold to which the reader adapts—as invoke it. 
The authors explain: 
Rather than relying on incantations, however, writers conjure their vision—a vision which they 
hope readers will actively come to share as they read the text—by using all the resources of lan-
guage available to them to establish a broad, and ideally coherent, range of cues for the reader. 
Technical writing conventions, for instance, quickly formalize any of several writer-reader rela-
tionships, such as colleague to colleague or expert to lay reader. 
Id. 
202  Selzer, supra note 191, at 163. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. at 164 (explaining that the intended audience is “the more or less concrete representa-
tion of readers that the writer conceives during composition and then uses to condition his or 
her developing work.”). Selzer acknowledges that the intended audience may never read the 
text, but that it nonetheless informs the work of the writer. Id. (emphasizing that writers con-
ceive of an audience and that conception “influence[s] the creative process”). Moreover, 
there may be readers who are not members of the intended audience. Id. (“[S]ome of those 
who do see the document . . . may not be intended readers.”). 
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sal audience as “a theoretical collection of rational people whose values and 
beliefs are grounded on rational thought [and an entity that functions as] ‘an 
active participant in the argumentation process . . . .’ ”205 Selzer’s notion of 
reader in the writer thus envisions audience in a manner loosely consistent with 
Cicero’s advice about imagining different types of people in the audience and 
calibrating speech to meet their peculiar expectations.206 
Selzer’s reader in the text category is similarly synthesized from a variety 
of sources.207 Selzer acknowledges that “the presence of the intended reader is 
ultimately manifested in the text itself[,]”208 but that, for a writer, as opposed to 
a speaker whose audience is real,209 “audiences are textual presences as well as 
intended or real ones.”210 So, this concept of reader in the text pivots from the 
idea that the writer has a conception of the audience in mind when drafting 
(reader in the writer) to the idea that this conception of audience should be 
manifested in the text itself (reader in the text). 
One subcategory of reader in the text is the “the implied reader” who “is 
known through the background knowledge and assumptions and values and 
other human characteristics implied by the language of that text.”211 Using 
Martin Luther King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” as an example, Selzer as-
serts that “King creates an implied reader in his text with the values of justice 
and tolerance, a knowledge of biblical and theological and political texts, and 
the attitudes of sympathy and generosity; it is this implied reader that King in-
vites his real readers to identify with.”212 Selzer observes that King also created 
other implied readers who stand in contrast to those with whom he wants his 
real readers to identify.213 These Selzer characterizes as “the ‘white moderates’ 
referred to late in the essay that King hopes his real readers will not identify 
themselves with.”214 
 
205  Id. at 165 (citations omitted) (noting that his construction of universal audience is based 
on the writings of Chaim Perelman). 
206  See supra Section II.C.1. 
207  See Selzer, supra note 191, at 166–69. The array of sources cited to and synthesized by 
Selzer—and their implications for a theory of audience—is beyond the scope of this Article. 
208  Id. at 166. 
209  Id. (identifying the audience for a speech as “real people on hand for the occasion of the 
speech.”). 
210  Id. (emphasis added). Selzer’s conception of reader in the text is expansive and addresses 
various distinctions between reader and audience which fall along the following dimensions: 
(a) how abstract the audience or reader is made out to be, (b) how involved or active the audi-
ence or reader is in the text itself, (c) how extensively the reader or audience influences inven-
tion, and (d) the extent to which the concept reflects a structuralist or poststructuralist view of 
language and text. 
Introduction to A RHETORIC OF DOING, supra note 191, at 13–14. 
211  Selzer, supra note 191, at 166. 
212  Id. at 167. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
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Also falling within the category of reader in the text is the “informed” 
reader, who is “something of a textual ideal that presupposes a general compe-
tence . . . [i]n the language of the text,” and also someone who is “actively en-
gaged in understanding a particular text.”215 
Selzer’s final category is “real readers,” or actual readers who truly exist. 
Here, again, Selzer’s work draws on a variety of sources.216 Recognizing that 
real readers may or may not be intended or invoked readers, Selzer distin-
guishes between single audiences, who “come to a text for the same reason,” 
and multiple audiences who “have to do with the multiple tasks—or multiple 
reading behaviors—that various readers may require of a text, whether those 
behaviors are implied in texts or assumed in fact by real, empirical readers.”217 
Selzer also distinguishes between real readers who are passive receivers, “un-
critical receptacles for taking in messages,”218 and readers who are more active. 
More active readers may include those who are resistant, who therefore “resist 
the roles set out for them [and also] resist the entire ideology of a text.”219 
These resisting readers are important for this Article’s consideration of ethos 
and persuasion, as “the notion of the resisting reader may be implicit in the 
very notion of persuasion in our culture, a notion that assumes readers who 
carefully guard—resist—ideological positions that are under siege by a rhe-
tor.”220 
Having considered modern notions of writer and audience, this Article will 
turn to consider how ethos may be manifested in a text. But we, reader and I, 
 
215  Id. at 168–69. Selzer explains: 
The informed reader is at once a communal reader predisposed by the linguistic codes and con-
ventions agreed on by an interpretive community and an individual reader in the world who is 
seeking to understand those codes completely. Or to put it in the terms of linguistic theory, the 
informed reader is a real reader striving to bring performance into conformity with competence. 
Id. 
216  Id. (“[U]nderstanding the nature of real readers is by no means uncomplicated.”). 
217  Id. at 170. 
218  Id. 
219  Id. at 171. 
220  Id. Selzer explains that “[r]esisting readers resist every kind of textual move; they move 
through discourse with a kind of skepticism or suspicion, implicitly counter the text at every 
opportunity, and finally may subjugate it to personal proclivities or counterideologies.” Id. 
Selzer’s thorough examination of the many meanings of audience provides a rich array of 
practical application. As Witte et al. observe: 
Selzer’s treatment of audience demonstrates—in a way and to an extent not found elsewhere—
how extremely rich and dynamic is audience as a theoretical construct. Not only does Selzer 
suggest that audience must be conceptualized in terms of interactions that obtain across his ma-
jor categories, but he also suggests that any theoretical accommodation of audience will have to 
treat both the interactions that may obtain within a given class and the multidimensional nature 
of consequent interactions in relation to, for example, invention. By bringing some semblance of 
order to an area that on first glance seems to defy order, Selzer has made simpler the tasks of the 
discourse or rhetorical theorist, the discourse analyst, and the classroom teacher by representing 
clearly and comprehensively the complex nature of the problems with which each must deal. 
Introduction to A RHETORIC OF DOING, supra note 191, at 14. 
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have now moved beyond looking only for Aristotelian notions regarding source 
characteristics of ethos, including how the writer’s intelligence, character, and 
good will are evinced in the text. We are also now able to examine how a text 
might manifest notions of both possession and appearance of the character of 
both the writer and the client (or claim). Further, we can explore how ethos is 
manifested in the text, and in the exchange between writer and varying notions 
of audience. 
B. Examining Ethos in Modern Text 
1. Framework for Ethotic Analysis 
A synthesis of the foregoing classical and contemporary views on ethotic 
location yields the following framework: 
Ethos in the Speaker/Writer 
• Prior Reputation (Isocrates, Cicero) 
• Institutional Authority (Amossy) 
• Historical Author/Empirical Subject (Corder, Cherry, Llorca) 
Ethos in the Speech/Text 
• Intelligence, Moral Character, Goodwill (Aristotle) 
• Discursive Ethos (Aristotle, Cicero, Rideout) 
• Persona/Mask 
▪ Of Author (Aristotle, Cicero, Baumlin and Meyer, Cherry, Corder) 
▪ Of Client (Cicero) 
Ethos in the Exchange 
• Audience Awareness of Prior Character (Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero) 
• Filters (Baumlin and Meyer) 
• Shared Knowledge (Amossy, Lunsford, and Ede) 
• Source Relational Characteristics (Weresh, Llorca) 
Notwithstanding this effort to identify potential ethotic locations, one must 
keep in mind that the lines differentiating between writer, text, audience, and 
exchange are blurred at best. Nonetheless, armed with these potential consider-
ations, this Article will now consider ethos in one piece of modern advoca-
cy—Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Pennsylva-





221  Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 555 U.S. 964, 964–67 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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2. Ethotic Target: Dunlap 
************ 
 
555 U.S. 964 
 
October 14, 2008 
 
No. 07–1486.   PENNSYLVANIA v. DUNLAP.   Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.   
Reported below: 596 Pa. 147, 941 A.2d 671. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, dissenting. 
 
North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike Force, 
was working the morning shift. Undercover surveillance. The neighborhood? 
Tough as a three-dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five years on the beat, nine months 
with the Strike Force. He’d made fifteen, twenty drug busts in the neighborhood. 
 
Devlin spotted him: a lone man on the corner. Another approached. Quick 
exchange of words. Cash handed over; small objects handed back. Each man 
then quickly on his own way. Devlin knew the guy wasn’t buying bus tokens. 
He radioed a description and Officer Stein picked up the buyer. Sure enough: 
three bags of crack in the guy’s pocket. Head downtown and book him. Just an-
other day at the office. 
 
*         *         * 
 
 
That was not good enough for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held 
in a divided decision that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defend-
ant. The court concluded that a “single, isolated transaction” in a high-crime ar-
ea was insufficient to justify the arrest, given that the officer did not actually see 
the drugs, there was no tip from an informant, and the defendant did not attempt 
to flee. 596 Pa. 147, 159, 941 A.2d 671, 679 (2007). I disagree with that conclu-
sion, and dissent from the denial of certiorari. A drug purchase was not the only 
possible explanation for the defendant’s conduct, but it was certainly likely 
enough to give rise to probable cause. 
 
The probable-cause standard is a “nontechnical conception that deals with 
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). What is required is simply “a reason-
able ground for belief of guilt,” id., at 371, (same)—a “probability, and not a 
prima facie showing, of criminal activity,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 
(1983) (same). “[A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own expe-
rience in deciding whether probable cause exists,” Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 700 (1996), including inferences “that might well elude an untrained 
person,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 
 
On the facts of this case, I think the police clearly had probable cause to ar-
rest the defendant. An officer with drug interdiction experience in the neighbor-
hood saw two men on a street corner—with no apparent familiarity or prior in-
teraction—make a quick hand-to-hand exchange of cash for “ ‘small objects.’ ” 
596 Pa., at 150, 941 A.2d, at 673. This exchange took place in a high-crime 
neighborhood, known for drug activity, far from any legitimate businesses. Per-
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haps it is possible to imagine innocent explanations for this conduct, but I can-
not come up with any remotely as likely as the drug transaction Devlin believed 
he had witnessed. In any event, an officer is not required to eliminate all inno-
cent explanations for a suspicious set of facts to have probable cause to make an 
arrest. As we explained in Gates, “[i]n making a determination of probable 
cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or 
‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncrim-
inal acts.” 462 U.S., at 244, n. 13. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that the police did not actual-
ly see any drugs. 596 Pa., at 159, 941 A.2d, at 679. But Officer Devlin and his 
partner were conducting undercover surveillance. From a distance, it would be 
difficult to have a clear view of the small objects that changed hands. As the 
Commonwealth explains in its petition for certiorari, the “classic” drug transac-
tion is a hand-to-hand exchange, on the street, of cash for small objects. Pet. for 
Cert. 5–8. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision will make it more diffi-
cult for the police to conduct drug interdiction in high-crime areas, unless they 
employ the riskier practice of having undercover officers actually make a pur-
chase or sale of drugs. 
 
The Pennsylvania court also noted that the defendant did not flee. 596 Pa., 
at 159, 941 A.2d, at 679. Flight is hardly a prerequisite to a finding of probable 
cause. A defendant may well decide that the odds of escape do not justify adding 
another charge to that of drug possession. And of course there is no suggestion 
in the record that the defendant had any chance to flee—he was caught redhand-
ed. 
 
Aside from its importance for law enforcement, this question has divided 
state courts, a traditional ground warranting review on certiorari. This Court’s 
Rule 10(b). The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that an “experienced nar-
cotics officer” had probable cause to make an arrest when—in a vacant lot in a 
high-drug neighborhood—he “saw defendant and his companion give money to 
[a] third person in exchange for small unknown objects.” State v. Moore, 181 
N.J. 40, 46–47, 853 A.2d 903, 907 (2004). The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
reached the same conclusion in a case where the defendants—through their car 
windows—exchanged cash for a small “bag of suspected narcotics.” State v. 
Castro, 891 A.2d 848, 851–854 (2006). In contrast, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that a hand-to-hand exchange of unknown objects did not give the 
police probable cause to make an arrest, even where one of the men was a 
known drug dealer. People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1377–1378 (1989). All 
these cases have unique factual wrinkles, as any probable-cause case would, but 
the core fact pattern is the same: experienced police officers observing hand-to-
hand exchanges of cash for small, unknown objects in high-crime neighbor-
hoods. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court speculated that such an exchange could 
have been perfectly innocent. But as Judge Friendly has pointed out, “[j]udges 
are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” 
United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977). Based not only on 
common sense but also his experience as a narcotics officer and his previous 
work in the neighborhood, Officer Devlin concluded that what happened on that 
street corner was probably a drug transaction. That is by far the most reasonable 
conclusion, even though our cases only require it to be a reasonable conclusion. 
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3. Ethotic Analysis 
This Article will now consider the development of ethos in the foregoing 
text. With such limited text, our dive will not necessarily be deep, but will il-
lustrate the plausibility of the posited loci for ethotic appeal: ethos of the writer, 
ethos of the client, ethos of the text, and ethos within the exchange. 
a. Ethos in the Writer 
We turn first to ethos of the writer—Chief Justice Roberts. Roberts has a 
prior reputation as a longstanding judicial officer and author of important legal 
texts. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, writing as an officer of the 
Court, possesses the type of institutional, authoritative appeal imagined in the 
classical view by Isocrates and Cicero and in the modern view by Amossy and 
Llorca.222 But, along the lines of Amossy’s and Llorca’s notions of ethos in the 
exchange, Roberts is also able to project an authoritative construct of the 
ethotic appeal of judges in general, and himself in particular, through the text. 
For example, he substantiates the authority of the judicial position in his use of 
the following quote: “Judges are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which 
ordinary citizens are free.”223 
In keeping with the notion of the historical author or empirical subject of 
Corder, Cherry, and Llorca, Roberts’s authorial presence is evident in the text: 
“I disagree with that conclusion, and dissent from the denial of certiorari.”224 
“On the facts of this case, I think the police clearly had probable cause to arrest 
the defendant.”225 Perhaps revealing his attitude toward his role as an officer of 
the Court along the lines of Llorca’s ethos-based rhetorical strategies, Roberts 
writes, “[p]erhaps it is possible to imagine innocent explanations for this con-
duct, but I cannot come up with any remotely as likely as the drug transaction 
Devlin believed he had witnessed.”226 He also exhibits attributes of ethos by 
carefully organizing and substantiating his assertions. 
b. Ethos in the Text 
Roberts, while writing as a judicial officer, employs the persona or mask of 
a hardboiled crime fiction piece: “The neighborhood? Tough as a three-dollar 
 
222  See supra Section II.A. 
223  Dunlap, 555 U.S. at 967 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Stanchich, 
550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (CA2 1977)). 
224  Id. at 965 (emphasis added). 
225  Id. (emphasis added). 
226  Id. 
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steak.”227 While this technique prompts ethotic appeal in the exchange as dis-
cussed below, it also evinces the discursive ethotic appeal of a persona. It is 
one that has been crafted to comport with Roberts’s legal conclusion—that the 
arresting officer had probable cause to make the stop, just as seasoned detec-
tives in hardboiled crime novels predictably solve the crime. Of course, that 
persona will resonate with individuals who agree with the conclusion. It will 
not with those who view it as disrespectful of the defendant, state courts, and 
crime-ridden neighborhoods. 
Roberts employs several other devices to evince ethos in the text. Setting 
up his discoursal self, he begins by framing the law in a manner that supports 
his ultimate position. Then, after laying out the test for probable cause, Roberts 
emphasizes: “What is required is simply ‘a reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt.’ ”228 His assertions are well supported by authority evincing the Aristo-
telean notion of intelligence, and he artfully discredits the opposing position 
with the following counterarguments: 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision will make it more difficult for the 
police to conduct drug interdiction in high-crime areas, unless they employ the 
riskier practice of having undercover officers actually make a purchase or sale 
of drugs. The Pennsylvania court also noted that the defendant did not flee. 
Flight is hardly a prerequisite to a finding of probable cause. . . . And of course 
there is no suggestion in the record that the defendant had any chance to flee—
he was caught redhanded.229 
With respect to the ethos of the client, we must recognize that Roberts’s 
dissent rules in favor of the State. We can therefore look to Roberts’s character-
ization of Officer Devlin, an agent of the State, and his construction of Devlin’s 
character for evidence of the ethos of the client. Roberts’s dissent highlights the 
credibility of Officer Devlin’s intuition and judgment as sufficient for probable 
cause: “Devlin knew.”230 Supporting his belief that “the police clearly had 
probable cause to arrest the defendant,”231 Roberts characterizes Devlin as 
“[a]n officer with drug interdiction experience in the neighborhood”232 who 
witnessed the interaction “in a high-crime neighborhood known for drug activi-
ty, far from any legitimate businesses,”233 lending credibility and ethos to the 
government’s position. The credibility of Devlin is further supported in Justice 
Roberts’s conclusion on probable cause, where Roberts tethers his own legal 
conclusion to Devlin’s credibility: 
Based not only on common sense but also his experience as a narcotics officer 
and his previous work in the neighborhood, Officer Devlin concluded that what 
 
227  Id. at 964. 
228  Id. at 965 (citation omitted). 
229  Id. at 966 (citation omitted). 
230  Id. at 964. 
231  Id. at 965. 
232  Id. 
233  Id. 
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happened on that street corner was probably a drug transaction. That is by far 
the most reasonable conclusion, even though our cases only require it to be a 
reasonable conclusion.234 
c. Ethos in the Exchange 
Regarding ethos in the exchange, we must first consider the audience for 
the opinion. Note that this is a dissent from a denial of certiorari. The intend-
ed/addressed audience of Ede and Lunsford, and the “informed” audience of 
Selzer,235 consists of both the general legal public, including state courts that 
routinely rule on Dunlap-style probable cause issues and the lawyers who rep-
resent clients in this area, as well as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from 
which the petition for certiorari arose. In Selzer’s categorization, implied read-
ers include those who share Roberts’s view of the Fourth Amendment and with 
whom assertions such as the following likely resonate: “Perhaps it is possible 
to imagine innocent explanations for this conduct, but I cannot come up with 
any remotely as likely as the drug transaction Devlin believed he had wit-
nessed.”236 Implied readers are also likely favorably influenced by the hard-
boiled crime persona that substantiates Roberts’s conviction on the issue of 
probable cause. 
Implied readers also most certainly include resistant readers whose views 
on the Fourth Amendment stand in contrast with Roberts’s position, and for 
whom Roberts may have had the following passages in mind: “In any event, an 
officer is not required to eliminate all innocent explanations for a suspicious set 
of facts to have probable cause to make an arrest.”237 “That is by far the most 
reasonable conclusion, even though our cases only require it to be a reasonable 
conclusion.”238 
With respect to all types of audience, Roberts must have had an intention 
of developing a connection with the audience by employing the crime-genre-
style introduction. This stylistic device evokes Amossy’s notion of stereotype 
and shared knowledge and Baumlin and Meyer’s notion of filters. The stylistic 
device prompts the use of stereotyping, both of the narrator who, in this type of 
genre, solves the crime with ease, and of the opposing party, or defendant. Sit-
uated in this unusual genre, at least in judicial opinion writing, the audience fil-
ters information, reading the narrator in a manner that may therefore comport 
with the historical author’s conclusion. 
The use of humor, literary references, and tropes establish both source-
characteristic and source-relational ethos.239 Roberts’s use of a fairly well-
 
234  Id. at 967. 
235  See supra Section III.A. 
236  Dunlap, 555 U.S. at 965 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
237  Id. at 965–66. 
238  Id. at 967. 
239  See generally Weresh, supra note 178. 
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known literary genre evinces cleverness, a source-characteristic example of 
ethos, and establishes a relationship based on shared knowledge between writer 
and reader, a source-relational characteristic.240 The use of this technique also 
resonates with Baumlin’s theory of character emerging in text, and the previ-
ously discussed triple movement of projecting for oneself in both an inward 
and outward manner, while also projecting on behalf of another. That is be-
cause Roberts has employed ethos-based strategies to build the character of the 
judicial writer, the crime-genre narrator, and also the voice, and ethos, of the 
arresting officer.241 
Of course, the novel, crime-genre technique does not evince ethos for all 
audiences. It likely does not resonate with the resistant readers who view the 
case quite differently. In fact, for those readers, such a technique may under-
mine the ethotic appeal of the author as it suggests he has not taken the case, or 
the rights of criminal defendants, seriously. 
CONCLUSION 
Both classical rhetoricians and modern scholars agree that effective legal 
persuasion depends on developing ethotic appeal. While the foregoing has been 
a limited evaluation of the potential loci for ethos in a written text, it does re-
veal a promising framework for future evaluation of ethos-based rhetorical 
strategies as they may be situated in the writer, text, and exchange. The tem-
plate further provides an author with a framework for considering posited loci 
to reinforce the impact of the ethotic appeal of the writer, of the text, and in the 
exchange taking place between author and audience. 
 
 
240  Helen A. Anderson, Police Stories, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 20 (2016). Anderson 
notes that “[t]he Dunlap dissent is perhaps the most obvious expression of the link between 
popular culture and the narratives in judicial opinions.” Id. I have asserted that literary refer-
ences and inside jokes are a form of gesture from the writer to the reader, a source relational 
form of ethos that establishes connection and trust. See Weresh, supra note 178, at 260–65. 
Anderson similarly observes that “the less literary police narratives found in appellate opin-
ions also tap into prevalent cultural stories about the police—stories of hardworking, embat-
tled officers.” Anderson, supra at 20. (emphasis added). 
241  Mark K. Osbeck, What Is “Good Legal Writing” and Why Does It Matter?, 4 DREXEL L. 
REV. 417, 445 (2012). Osbeck notes that a writer “may make effective use of a voice that is 
not the writer’s own, but rather a character the writer wants the reader to identify with.” Id. 
In the introductory scene Roberts set in Dunlap, “he cleverly employs the point of view as 
well as the voice of the arresting officer in order to help the reader appreciate the officer’s 
perspective on whether there was probable cause to make an arrest . . . .” Id. 
20 NEV. L.J. 877 















[THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
